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THE AUTHORS
1SUMMARY
This report surveys a dozen international comparative studies of poverty,
income distribution and the elderly in OECD countries.  It updates a
previous Department of Social Security report - Whiteford and Kennedy,
1995, based on data from the mid- to late-1980s - including information
up to the mid-1990s.
The report addresses a series of questions.  What level are the incomes of
the elderly relative to the population as a whole?  How has this changed
over the past two decades?  How many of the old are poor?  How many
of the poor are old?  Are the oldest of the old poorer than younger
pensioners are?  How do widows fare?  What is the mix between public
and private sources of income?  Do the elderly poor remain poor?  There
is also a discussion of methodological issues.
The results show that the incomes of the elderly are typically around 80
per cent of incomes of the populations as a whole.  In most countries,
this ratio has been increasing over the past two decades.  Although there
remain pockets of poverty among the elderly, most studies show that the
old are represented proportionally or under-represented among the poor.
The papers present conflicting pictures of the position of the United
Kingdom.  There is, however, no consistent evidence that pensioners in
the United Kingdom are better or worse off than their counterparts
overseas.
There are several significant measurement issues and methodological
differences between existing studies of cross-country comparisons of
pensioner incomes.  The inclusiveness of the income measure, the
population reference group, unit of measurement (household or family)
and choice of equivalence scale have significant impacts on the ordering
of different countries on measures of the economic well-being of
pensioners (Chapter 1).
A cross-study comparison of average replacement rates - pensioners’
incomes as a percentage of population incomes - suggests that the United
Kingdom is normally in the middle of the bottom half of the distribution.
The most recent OECD study - based on data from the mid-1990s - puts
the United Kingdom 11th out of 15.  The average pensioner replacement
rate is 78 per cent in the United Kingdom, compared with a 15-country
mean of 83 per cent (Chapter 2).
2However, this result is sensitive to the comparison group.  In one study,
for example, the United Kingdom’s replacement rate relative to the
population is five percentage points below the mean but just two points
below when measured relative to older workers.  Separating pensioner
couples and single pensioners also alters the ordering, and implies (as
indeed turns out to be the case) that choice of equivalence scale also
matters (Section 2.1).
Observed pensioner incomes decline with age in most countries, including
the United Kingdom.  This is partly explained by a cohort effect.  Each
successive generation of retirees had higher earnings during their working
life, which increases rights to earnings-related pensions, such as
occupational schemes in the United Kingdom and increases their ability
to make voluntary provision for retirement.  In addition, pension schemes
in many countries are not yet mature.  In the United Kingdom, the value
of benefits under the State Earnings-R elated Pension Scheme (SER PS)
only peaked for new retirees in 1998.  Improvements to the portability
of occupational plans in the 1970s and 1980s have yet to feed fully through
to benefits (Section 2.2).
There are many difficulties in examining absolute living standards of
pensioners.  Such comparisons are based on purchasing power parities to
avoid distortions from fluctuating exchange rates.  They suggest that
North American pensioners do better than European pensioners do, with
the United Kingdom close to, but below, the European average.
However, the distribution of absolute incomes is more compressed in
the United Kingdom than other countries, with the exceptions of the
Netherlands and Sweden (Section 2.3).
Analysis of absolute standards should, for comparability with replacement
rate studies, use purchasing power parities adjusted by an equivalence
scale (as in recent work at the Luxembourg Income Study).  Such
adjustments alter the position of other countries relative to the United
Kingdom considerably.  For example, Swedish pensioners would become
less well off than in the United Kingdom and Italian pensioners better
off, than with unadjusted purchasing power parity comparisons (Section
2.3).
We examine the correlation of replacement rates for different countries
across pairs of studies.  Correlations are generally positive, but not strong
except ‘within house’ (the successive OECD studies).  Once the average
replacement rates are disaggregated (e.g. by household type) the
correlations become weaker.  Choice of equivalence scale affects the
absolute replacement rates but does not significantly alter the rankings of
different countries (Section 2.4).
3R elative to the rest of the population, pensioners are typically under-
represented in the bottom one and two deciles, and over-represented in
the third to fifth.  This also holds in the United Kingdom.  One implication
is that the choice of poverty line in poverty comparisons will be crucial
to countries’ rankings (Section 3).
We examine pensioner income poverty rates in different countries and
how the ordering of countries is affected by different poverty lines.  The
United Kingdom is generally in the middle of the distribution of poverty
rates.  Nevertheless, the sensitivity to assumptions is indicated by a
comparison of the Bradshaw-Chen study, which adopts an idiosyncratic
treatment of housing benefit, with the Atkinson et al. study, both of
which are based on Luxembourg Income Study data.  We again examine
the correlation of rankings given by different studies.  The United
Kingdom tends to have lower poverty rates in more recent than in earlier
studies (Section 4.1).
A second measure of relative poverty is the share of the poor that are
elderly, as opposed to the share of the elderly that are poor.  The studies
again (with the exception of Bradshaw-Chen) point to a low-to-middle
poverty share in the United Kingdom within the country rankings (Section
4.2).
In terms of pensioner income inequality, the United Kingdom lies in the
middle of the distribution of OECD countries.  Countries with a ‘flat’
component to their public pension scheme tend to have lower income
inequality, whereas earnings-related public pensions (the ‘Bismarck’
system) have greater inequality.  This finding remains even when we
include other, private sources of income (Chapter 5).
R eplacement rates among pensioners have increased at a faster rate
between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s than an OECD 14-country
average.  However, this growth is largely among younger pensioners
(65-74) rather than older pensioners (75+) (Section 6.1).
R eplacement rates in the United Kingdom rose during the 1980s, as
they did in other countries.  Pensioner poverty in the United Kingdom
fell sharply in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s (Section 6.2).
In all countries surveyed, state benefits account for almost all the income
of the lowest quintile of pensioners.  However, income shares from
different sources vary widely across countries in the upper quintiles.  In
continental European countries, pensioners in the highest income groups
also receive the vast majority of their income from the state.  Elsewhere,
private pensions and voluntary savings make up a sizeable proportion of
the income of these richer groups (Section 7).
We examine some preliminary findings from studies on the ‘persistence’
of poverty among pensioners.  Strong measures of persistence rely on
4long panels, which are generally not available.  Over shorter periods,
pensioners are moderately more likely to be persistently poor than other
population groups.  One study of the United Kingdom suggests that just
under a quarter of single pensioners are persistently poor, with a much
lower fraction among couples (Section 8.1).
Widowhood is associated with a large fall in income, but on an equivalised
scale, the standard of living may not fall.  However, widows are often
poorer because of differential mortality by income of deceased spouse
(Section 8.3).
A major limitation of the standard measure of pensioner ‘income’ is that
it is not measured as a finite life annuity.  An ideal measure of ‘command
over resources’ would incorporate the stock of wealth to which the
household has access, adjusted for the effect of inflation.  Thus, the
rundown of accrued private pension wealth (dis-saving) is treated as
‘income’ whereas housing equity gains (wealth acquisition) are ignored.
This requires comparisons of income and wealth of the elderly.  There
are implications for the ordering of countries with respect to pensioners’
incomes.  For example, Australian pensioners tend to have below-average
incomes and above-average wealth (Section 9.1).
Housing wealth is an important component of imputed income for many
older households: its use, for example, could reduce significantly measured
poverty among very elderly households outside the poorest quintile.
However, the equity release market is quite thin.  The evidence that
pensioner households use house moves to release equity in the United
Kingdom is strong, but many elderly households are reluctant to move at
all, even when they have high potential values of housing equity.  Large
houses (relative to income) are both a blessing and a curse, from the
point of view of pensioner well-being (Section 9.2).
The absence of datasets that combine information on income and
expenditure in most countries prevents a cross-country comparison of
the impact of indirect taxes on pensioners’ relative living standards.  Data
for the United Kingdom show that pensioners pay around two per cent
of income less in indirect taxes than the working age population.  Since
indirect tax regimes differ substantially between OECD countries, we
would expect to see some re-orderings if indirect taxes were taken into
account (Section 9.3).
The elderly tend to benefit from publicly provided healthcare more than
people of working age, but the value of this provision varies between
different countries.  Working age people tend to gain from publicly
provided education, little of which goes to the elderly.  Taking these two
spending programmes together, the elderly tend to benefit a little more
on average than people of working age.  The impact in the United
Kingdom is similar to the average across countries.  Inclusion of in-kind
incomes of this sort has little effect on the United Kingdom’s ranking
with respect to the living standards of the elderly (Section 9.5).
5The main goal of retirement-income systems of all types is to ensure that
the elderly have the resources to support an adequate standard of living.1
How can we measure countries’ success at achieving this goal?
This report compares current pensioners’ incomes with current workers’
incomes to assess the living standards of the elderly against those of society
as whole, both in the United Kingdom and in other OECD countries.2
It surveys the existing comparative literature by drawing on data from
numerous international studies, typically relating to the early and mid-
1990s.  Most OECD countries are represented in at least one of these
analyses.  It seeks to provide an answer to the question: how do pensioners
in the United Kingdom fare relative to those of other, comparable,
countries?
Different OECD countries have adopted a variety of retirement income
systems, varying from schemes with comprehensive earnings replacement
through to floor-based and flat pension formulae.  The extent of private-
sector involvement also varies considerably.  The main policy issue that
stems from this comparison is: how well do different systems fare in
delivering benefits to pensioners?  Ultimately, however, whatever the
structure of public sector benefits and the public-private mix, more
generous pension benefits as a share of total output require higher taxes
or higher contributions from those of working age.  The same factors -
contribution rates as a share of payroll, the support ratio of workers to
pensioners and public budgetary policies - underpin the treatment of
pensioners whatever the retirement income system.3
We address many specific questions in this survey.  We begin by examining
the methodological questions involved in making such comparisons, such
as different measures of household income, measures of income poverty
etc. (Chapter 1).  Chapter 2 compares average pensioner incomes to
average non-pensioner and population incomes (‘replacement rates’).
These averages, however, can disguise a range of differences between
different pensioner households in the two groups.  Chapter 2 also looks
at replacement rates for pensioners disaggregated by sex, age and marital
status.  Chapter 3 looks at how pensioners fit into the population income
distribution.
1 There may of course be other goals, since retirement income systems have an impact
on household labour supply: see Mulligan (2000).
2 An alternative methodology is to estimate future hypothetical pension entitlements
for a range of different characteristics.  For examples of this approach, see Aldrich
(1982), Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), Eurostat (1993), Table 1.1 of Johnson (1999)
and McHale (1999).
3 Disney and Johnson (forthcoming).
OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT
6Chapter 4 concentrates on the bottom end of the income distribution.  It
asks: relative to standard poverty benchmarks, how many of the old are
poor?  It also asks the reverse question: how many of the poor are old?
Answers to both are an essential input to anti-poverty policy.
Next, in Chapter 5, the report looks at the distribution of income among
pensioners rather than relative to the population as a whole.  Chapter 6
then examines income trends: are today’s pensioners better off than in
the past?  Have they fared better or worse than workers have?  Chapter 7
examines the income sources of the elderly as a whole and at different
points of the income distribution.  Chapter 8 of the report explores
individual income dynamics in retirement: are the elderly poor persistently
poor?   Chapter 9 looks at attempts to broaden the income concept
beyond the standard of cash and near cash incomes.  It looks at measures
of ‘in-kind’ incomes from public services - such as health and education
- and how they affect the living standards of different demographic groups.
It also explores pensioners’ wealth as a way of capturing a wider concept
of command over resources.
Finally, Chapter 10 draws together the threads.  It answers the broad
question: how do UK pensioners fare compared with their counterparts
in other European countries?  It asks whether differences in incomes,
replacement rates and poverty across countries can be explained by ‘real’
differences or by differences in methodology.  It also asks: what kinds of
data are we lacking in order to provide the definitive answer on this
issue?
One caveat is necessary.  This procedure of examining the current income
of pensioners, and in particular, of comparing incomes with those of
current workers must be used with care.  In a contribution-based system,
today’s pensions depend on past contributions, past earnings and indeed
the past savings behaviour of today’s pensioners.  They also depend on
the past rules of the pension system, which have changed significantly in
most European countries in the last few years - and not least in the
United Kingdom.  This will affect the pattern of pensioners’ incomes,
now and in the future.  One illustration is that in an immature scheme,
incomes of the elderly may be observed to decline sharply with age.
However, it would be a mistake to infer from this that we should change
all the eligibility criteria currently in place.  For example, many married
women chose to pay the reduced rate of National Insurance contribution
in the past and this has an impact on their pensions today.  In general,
too, past treatment of widows and spouses has a large impact on current
entitlements.  Some current policies - for example, how we link pensions
in payment to costs and/ or standards of living - impact on living standards
today.  Other policies - for example, the effects of Home R esponsibilities
Protection - may take many years to exert their full effects.  Many reforms
undertaken now to improve pensioner living standards are likely to come
to fruition only in many years’ time.
74 Appendix A describes in detail the data sources underlying the different studies.
Finally, it is important to note that the most recent data underlying the
different studies are from the mid-1990s.4   Thus, recent policy reforms -
both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere - are not reflected in the
results.

9Before turning to the empirical results, this Chapter provides a guide to
some of the measurement issues we encounter later.  How can one define
poverty and how can one measure it?  Many of these issues have themselves
generated a large literature.  The treatment here, for reasons of space, is
therefore cursory.
Poverty is a very broad concept and the many dimensions of social
exclusion and deprivation can only be captured with a range of indicators.5
The studies surveyed in this report, however, focus on income as a
definition of well-being.  Here, therefore, we use the term ‘poverty’ as
shorthand for low income while acknowledging that low income is alone
unable to capture all the facets of poverty and deprivation.
There are two basic approaches to defining poverty: an absolute standard
and a relative standard.6,7  One type of absolute standard compares
households’ resources with a minimum level of consumption to support
basic needs (food, shelter, etc.).8   Another type compares peoples’ incomes
with the minimum, safety-net income specified by the social assistance
system.9
MEASUREMENT ISSUES1
1.1  What is poverty?
5 See, for example, Department of Social Security (1999, 2000e).  The Joseph R owntree
Foundation has also looked at broader measures of deprivation (Gordon et al., 2000
and Howarth et al., 1998).  The Irish government, too, includes a number of facets of
social exclusion in its anti-poverty strategy: see Department of Social, Community
and Family Affairs (1998, 2000).
6 Madden (2000) adopts a general approach combining both relative and absolute
methods.  He calculates an income elasticity of the poverty line, which sets how
quickly the poverty threshold grows over time as incomes grow, based on the change
in broader measures of deprivation over time.
7 A third option is the so-called ‘subjective’ approach, which asks the population what
they think is an adequate, minimum income.  Typically, the result is much higher
than official poverty lines.  Examples include Colasanto, Kapteyn and van der Gaag
(1984), Danziger et al. (1984c), De Vos and Garner (1991), Goedhart et al. (1977),
Kapteyn, Kooreman and Willemse (1988), Piachaud (1987), Van den Bosch et al.
(1993), Van Praag et al. (1982) and Walker (1987).  In international comparisons, this
approach shares the problems of any absolute standard, with the added problem of
very different popular views of what constitutes poverty both over time and between
countries.
8 The poverty line in the United States, for example, is based on the cost of a minimum
basket of goods from 1959 data uprated in line with the consumer price index.
9 Austria and Germany define poverty relative to social-assistance minima.  Gustafsson
and Lindblom (1993) is an international study of income poverty using such thresholds.
10
The second approach assumes that poverty is relative: poverty is defined
in comparison with the living standards of society as a whole.  Over the
long term, governments have tended to increase the safety-net level of
income faster than prices, implying that societies’ (or at least governments’)
views of poverty change over time.  Absolute poverty lines set as a
minimum consumption basket become out of date.  When real incomes
are growing, poverty measured against a constant real standard will tend
to decline, although there will also be high levels of cyclical variation.10
Minimum, absolute poverty standards also make little sense in international
comparisons.  First, basic needs probably differ between countries.
Secondly, the chosen poverty line has to be translated into different
currencies.  Market currency rates are very volatile, but even purchasing
power parities - which compare the cost of a common consumption
basket - are inappropriate, because they aim to equalise the cost of
population expenditure and not the consumption of the poor.11   Thirdly,
countries’ average incomes differ.  Even within the European Union,
poverty rates measured against a benchmark of 50 per cent of EU-wide
average consumption varied from under five per cent in Belgium,
Denmark and the Netherlands to nearly 70 per cent in Portugal.12
Most international studies, therefore, measure poverty as a relative concept,
typically the proportions with incomes below some ratio of the average
income.13   Comparisons of the characteristics of the poor also often define
the poor as some part of the income distribution, such as the bottom
fifth.  (This obviously makes no sense in comparing aggregate poverty
rates because they are, by definition, 20 per cent in each country.)
Nearly all the studies reported here use income as a measure of welfare.
O ther analyses, however, have used a measure of consumption.14
10 The distinction between relative and absolute standards is not always clear.  Jännti and
Danziger (2000), for example, define a relative view as ‘one in which the rules for
identifying the poor change as (some) other economic conditions change’.  But they
go on to argue that changes in economic conditions can redefine an absolute view of
poverty.
11 Dowrick and Quiggin (1994).
12 Eurostat (1990).  See also De Vos and Zaidi (1998).
13 Smeeding and Torrey (1988) is one exception: an international study using an absolute
definition of poverty.  The authors apply the United States poverty line, adjusted by
purchasing power parities, to a range of OECD countries.
14 R amprakash (1994) and Eurostat (1990) report that consumption-based measures
show a very different picture from income measures of relative poverty in different
countries of the European Union.  For a discussion of the merits of the two indicators,
see also Cutler and Katz (1992), Johnson and Shipp (1997) and Slesnick (1993, 1994)
on the United States; Blundell and Preston (1995) and Goodman and Webb (1995)
on the United Kingdom; and Van den Bosch and Marx (1996) for estimates for 14
OECD countries.  Smeaton and Hancock (1995) look specifically at trends in
pensioners’ expenditure in the United Kingdom.  Bierings (2000) compares
consumption of elderly and non-elderly households for EU member states.
1.2  Income or consumption?
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Household expenditure is a more direct measure of living standards.  If
people’s spending plans are based on expected lifetime income, then
consumption might give a better picture of command over resources
than annual income.15  Students, for example, might have low current
incomes, but finance a higher level of expenditure through borrowing.
Nevertheless, a household with a relatively high income, but high saving,
would have relatively low current consumption.  Its members might
even count as poor, despite the greater command over resources and
consumption possibility than a household with a lower income, lower
saving and the same current consumption.  This is particularly pertinent
because older households do seem to cut consumption expenditures on
retirement (Banks, Blundell and Tanner, 1998).
Consumption can be a more robust indicator of living standards when
incomes vary.  This can be important for particular groups, such as the
self-employed16, and can also make a difference in time-series studies.  In
the United Kingdom, for example, the inequality of incomes has increased
much more than inequality of household expenditure.  This could be
interpreted as the effect of greater income volatility, which households
absorb by smoothing their consumption over time.  This increased income
risk should reduce households’ welfare, and this is reflected in studies
based on expenditure when households increase their precautionary savings
against future income shocks.17
Household expenditure can also be a better welfare indicator when
incomes are misreported.  Consumption data, for example, give a different
picture of the living standards of the self-employed than income data.18
Nevertheless, measurement is also a problem with using consumption.
For example, ‘lumpy’ purchases, such as durable goods, can distort the
measure, although averaging over sufficient households can mitigate this
effect.  There are many other problems in interpreting household
expenditure data as the measure of consumption appropriate for
distributional studies.19
The data underlying the papers we survey here are based on similar
concepts of income.  This comprises earnings, public transfers, investment
incomes, private pensions etc.  Typically, the studies exclude all (or at
least some kinds of) capital gains, because the receipt of a capital gain in
a particular period reflects the accrual of gains over the period an asset
was held.  Including such gains would artificially broaden the income
15 Some of the arguments between income and consumption as an indicator are therefore
similar to the question of the relevant accounting period (discussed in Section 1.9
below).
16 Baekgaard (1998) finds large numbers of farmers reporting negative incomes: he argues
that consumption is a better indicator of living standards.
17 Kimball (1990).
18 See, for example, Baker (1993) on the United Kingdom.
19 Kay, Keen and Morris (1984).
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distribution.  Incomes in kind are also excluded.  Chapter 9 looks at
attempts to measure the value of benefits in kind and their effect on
various different measures of relative living standards of the elderly.
Another problem in defining incomes is the treatment of lump-sum
distributions from private pensions, which is naturally very important for
assessing the relative economic status of the elderly.  In Australia, most
private pensions are received as a lump sum rather than an annuity stream.20
Lump sums are also important in Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States.  Usually, these are excluded because income is often defined
as only recurrent receipts.  The rationale is that such one-off receipts are
probably consumed over a longer period than the year in which they
were paid.21  The result of including lump sums would be a small group
of elderly at retirement with very large measured incomes.  However,
their exclusion will result in measured replacement rates lower than their
‘true’ value.
Nearly all the results show incomes net of personal income taxes and
social-security contributions.  O ther taxes are ignored.  The most
significant omission is indirect taxes, which include excise duties and
general consumption taxes (such as value-added tax).  This exclusion
affects the results because different goods and services are taxed at different
rates.  Since consumption patterns vary with both income and age, the
indirect tax burden will also vary.  This should also have an impact on
international comparisons, since European governments, for example,
collect a much bigger portion of revenues from indirect taxes than
countries without a value-added tax, such as the United States.22
Although many elderly people live alone or with their spouse, others live
in larger households.  In addition, most of the results compare the elderly
with the population as a whole.  Some studies are based on ‘family’ or
‘income’ units, which consist of a single person or couple and any
dependent children.  An elderly couple living with a grown-up child and
his or her spouse count as two units under this approach, and their incomes
are treated separately.  Other studies are based on household-level incomes.
The living arrangements of the elderly differ significantly internationally,
even between OECD countries.  Table 1.1 shows, for example, the
proportion of the elderly living with their children.  The proportions are
high in Japan and southern Europe and very low in the Nordic countries
and the Netherlands.  In most countries, there has been a substantial
20 See Bateman and Piggott (1999, 2001) and Doyle and Piggott (2001).
21 Hicks (1946) proposed this differentiation between recurrent and one-off receipts.
The Haig-Simons definition of income would include such lump-sum payments.
See the discussion in Everaers, van der Laan and McDonald (2000) and Chapter 9 of
this report.
22 See OECD (1999).  Adema (1999) and Adema et al. (1996) show how differences in
indirect taxes affect measures of social expenditures.
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decline over time.  In the United Kingdom, for example, a third of the
elderly lived with their children in the early 1960s, twice today’s level.
The major issue in the choice between the household and the family as
the unit of measurement is the degree to which people share resources in
the household.  Some of the household’s resources can be enjoyed equally,
but members probably do not share their entire incomes equally (or the
entire costs, of housing, for example).23  The ‘true’ measure of the welfare
of an individual is likely to lie somewhere between a share of the household
income and their own (or their own family unit’s) income.24
Table 1.1  Proportion of over 65s living with their children
Per cent
Japan 65
Italy 39
Spain 30
Austria 25
France 17
United Kingdom 16
United States 15
Finland 14
Germany 14
N orway 11
N etherlands 8
Sweden 5
D enmark 4
N ote: data for various years between 1987 and 1990.
Source: O ECD  (1994)
The results of measures of income inequality and poverty are quite sensitive
to the choice of unit: typically, the smaller the unit of measurement, the
larger is measured poverty and inequality.  Goodman, Johnson and Webb
(1997), for example, report that using the family unit in the United
Kingdom would increase the proportion of the population with below
half-average incomes by a third compared with household-based measures.
Closely related to the issue of measurement unit is the way in which
welfare is assigned to individuals based on the consumption or income of
23 Empirical tests of sharing, based on women’s labour supply, for example, reject the
hypothesis that the household can be treated as a single utility-maximising unit (Thomas,
1990; McElroy, 1999).  Theoretical studies, based on household-bargaining models,
show that the equal-sharing outcome is a special case (Browning et al., 1994).  Women’s
increased participation has led to a more equal distribution of income within households
(see Webb, 1993, on the United Kingdom), which may have changed the intra-
familial distribution of resources.
24 The empirical literature on this question is small due to the paucity of data on intra-
household income allocation.  Discussions of the issue include Borooah and McKee
(1994), Haddad and Kanbur (1990), Jenkins (1991), Lazear and Michael (1988), Smith
et al. (1991) and Woolley and Marshall (1994).  There is a large theoretical literature:
see Becker (1981a,b) and Sen (1984), for example.
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the household.  This makes implicit assumptions both about how resources
are shared and about how the cost of living varies with household size.
Studies usually assume a degree of economies of scale: not quite that ‘two
can live as cheaply as one’, but generally that two people with an income
of around 1½ times a single person have the same living standard.  This
adjustment is called an equivalence scale.
The choice of equivalence scale has an important effect on comparisons
of incomes of the elderly with population incomes, because household
size varies systematically with the age of the household head.25  Older
people tend (in most countries, especially richer ones) to live in smaller
households (either alone or with their spouse) than people of working
age.26  In poorer countries, the issue is still more complex, because the
elderly mainly live in multi-generational households.  Deaton and Paxson
(1995) argue: ‘Conclusions about the living standards of the elderly in
India are…less determined by the data than by assumptions about who
gets what and how poverty lines vary with household composition.
Although it is perhaps less obvious in the US, and certainly less attention
is paid to it, the same is true.’  Appendix C of the report provides a more
detailed analysis of the equivalence-scale problem.
There are even many different answers to the simple question of: who
are the elderly?  Where possible, we have taken samples based solely on
age (typically 65).27  Some studies use alternative criteria, including labour-
market status or pension-benefit receipt.  However, a small minority of
elderly households in most countries has income from earnings, and these
tend to be among the higher-income elderly.  A sample based on pension
benefit receipt misses people who are ineligible, and many of these are
on the lowest incomes.  Choosing a sample solely by age avoids these
distortions.
Another sampling issue is the institutional population.  Nearly all the
data sources underlying the studies reported here sample only the
household population.  However, many of the elderly in industrialised
countries live in institutions: nine per cent in the Netherlands, for example,
and seven per cent in Finland and Canada.  R ates of institutionalisation
vary internationally, with the elderly infirm in some countries living
1.6  Defining the elderly
25 Significant studies of equivalence scales include Aarberge and Melby (1998), Buhmann
et al. (1988), Deaton and Muellbauer (1986), De Vos and Zaidi (1997) and Lanjouw,
Milanovic and Paternostro (1998).
26 In some countries, young, single people are an exception - they often live alone -
although in others younger workers mainly stay with their parents.
27 Age 65 is the most common state pension age in OECD countries and recent increases
in pension age mean that most OECD members will converge on this level in the
future (Disney and Whitehouse, 1999 and World Bank, 1999).  However, the majority
of people typically retire before this age: some studies therefore include people under
65 who are not in work.
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mainly with relatives rather than in residential or nursing homes.  Even
among OECD countries, less than one per cent of over 65s in Turkey
live in institutions and just two per cent in Portugal.28  The rate in the
United Kingdom - 5.1 per cent - is around the average for 22 OECD
countries.
Life expectancy is far from uniform: longevity differs systematically
between the sexes and between income groups.  These differences must
be borne in mind when interpreting many of the results.  Since women
tend to live longer than men do, they make up the majority of the old.
Nevertheless, as general life expectancy increases, the proportion of men
among the elderly increases.  This also means that the proportion of
married couples in the pensioner population will increase over time.
Furthermore, richer countries have recently seen a narrowing of the
gender-longevity gap, adding to this effect.  This also influences
comparisons of incomes by age: the oldest of the old are predominantly
single women.  The group of younger old contains more couples and
more men.  Increasing divorce rates have the opposite effect.  Pensioners
may now be less likely to be widowed, but they are more likely to be
divorced.
Income distributions vary both between countries and in the same country
over time.  Some studies measure inequality and poverty among the
elderly against the population income distribution: for example, the
proportion of pensioners that is in the poorest fifth of society.  This
implies a very different living standard relative to the national average in
countries with a broad income distribution - such as the United States -
than in countries with a more equal distribution of incomes - in continental
Europe, for example.  This can be illustrated by the ratios of the value of
the twentieth percentile of the income distribution to the median and
the mean income in some example countries:29
United United
Sweden Kingdom States
P20/median 68% 61% 53%
P20/mean 62% 51% 43%
1.7  Differential longevity
1.8  The shape of the income
distribution
28 OECD (1996a), Table 3.1.  Evans (1995) looks at the incomes of the institutional
population in the United Kingdom.
29 Source: Förster and Pellizzari (2000), Table 2.2.  Based on samples of the whole
population.  The P20 value relates to the upper bound of the lowest quintile of the
income distribution (not to the mean of the quintile income).
16
Alternative measures - for example, against a proportion of national average
income - are more robust to these problems.
Some studies use proportions of the median rather than the mean income
in these measures.  It is well known that the mean is less robust to high-
income outliers than the median.  Moreover, the median income is always,
in practice, lower than the mean because income distributions are
positively skewed.  These differences in measure again can affect the
results significantly.  This should be borne in mind when interpreting
the data.
Most surveys underlying the studies use annual incomes.  Others, including
surveys in Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom aggregate shorter
periods (weeks or months) into annual equivalents, although some incomes
- from self-employment and capital, for example - are measured over
longer periods.  Shorrocks (1976) showed that measures of inequality
increase the shorter the period over which incomes are measured under
quite general conditions.  The effect on poverty measures depends on
the precise threshold and the density of the income distribution around
that point (R avallion, 1988).  Empirical studies have tended to show
small effects.30  Other studies have aggregated incomes over longer periods,
arguing that lifetime or long-term poverty is a better measure of ‘true’
deprivation than short-term measures.  This question is considered in
Chapter 8.
The results in this report are often presented as ‘replacement rates’: the
ratio of elderly incomes to non-elderly or population incomes.  This of
course differs from individual replacement rates, which are measured
against the pre-retirement incomes or earnings of an individual pensioner.
The denominator used in the different studies varies: some use non-
pensioners while some use the population.  The latter will give lower
pensioner replacement rates if pensioners’ incomes are less than the
population as a whole.  Furthermore, the effect will increase the larger is
the gap between the two and the larger the proportion of elderly in the
population.  One study compares incomes of the elderly with older
working age households to give a replacement rate relative to pre-
retirement income.  (This is therefore a little closer to measures of
individual replacement rates.)  This will typically reduce measured
replacement rates, because these middle-aged groups tend to have higher
earnings and incomes than the working-age population as a whole.
The final and most complex issue is interpreting the magnitude of
replacement rates: what does it mean for living standards if we say that
1.9  Time period of
measurement
30 Böheim and Jenkins (2000), Morris and Preston (1986) and Nolan (1987) on the
United Kingdom; R uggles (1990) and National R esearch Council (1995) on the
United States.
1.10  Interpreting replacement
rates
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pensioners enjoy an average of 80 per cent of the population income?
For example, people no longer face the costs of work when they are
retired (commuting, special clothing etc.).  A replacement rate of 100
per cent would therefore probably reflect a sizeable increase in living
standards.  Many studies have shown a large drop in consumption at the
time of retirement.  However, it is difficult to isolate the impact of misplaced
expectations of retirement income from any desired reduction in
spending.31  Younger pensioners, for example, may also derive utility
from increased leisure time, particularly if the requirement of their pre-
retirement job prevented them from adjusting working hours to optimise
the trade-off between work and leisure.  Increased leisure time also
provides opportunities for home production (DIY, cookery, gardening
etc.) that might not have been possible before.  These add to utility but
are not measured in conventional distributional studies.32
Other important questions include the pattern of marginal utility of income
with age.33  For example, the very elderly may be unable to enjoy expensive
leisure pursuits, although they may have large health and care costs.  The
costs of disability are ignored.
Some studies have shown that the elderly tend to spend less than their
income, accumulating rather than decumulating savings as the lifecycle
model of consumption would suggest.34   This points to a higher than
desired replacement rate in retirement, but it may reflect the elderly
undoing the degree of annuitisation of their wealth in public and private
pension schemes.35   For example, there may be precautionary motives
for saving (healthcare costs etc.) or a desire to bequeath wealth to children36
or to charity.
There is also a measurement problem because household surveys exclude
the institutional population (see Section 1.6).  This group is often running
down assets rapidly to pay for their care.  Although they, on average,
31 See, for example, Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1998).  Dilnot et al. (1994) Chapter 5
looks at retirement-income expectations and outcomes.
32 Goldschmidt-Clermont and Pagnossin-Aligisakis (1999) estimate the monetary value
of production outside the System of National Accounts on the basis of data on labour
inputs to these activities for 14 countries.
33 The retired have a lower opportunity cost of time than people in work.  They might
therefore be able to invest more time in ‘penny-pinching’ (Posner, 1995), which
would give the elderly a higher standard of living for a given level of observed
expenditure.
34 See, inter alia, Bernheim (1987), Börsch-Supan (1992), Disney (1996a,b), Hamermesh
(1984), Hurd and Wise (1989b), Jianakpolos, Mechnik and Irvine (1989), Mirer (1980)
and Shorrocks (1975).
35 The appearance of asset accumulation in studies based on cross-section (rather than
panel) data may also reflect the impact of differential mortality.
36 The elderly could also provide incentives for their children to care for them with the
prospect of inheritance, known as ‘strategic’ rather than ‘altruistic’ bequests (Bernheim,
Shleifer and Summers, 1985).
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make up only five per cent of the elderly in OECD countries, the effect
of their exclusion is likely to distort the observed pattern of asset
accumulation and decumulation.
Figure 1.1  Poverty head-counts and poverty gaps
The standard measure of poverty is a head-count: the number (or
proportion) of households, families or people with incomes below
the chosen threshold (relative or absolute).  There are two closely
related problems with this technique.
First, the choice of threshold is inevitably arbitrary and, depending on
the distributions of incomes, small changes in the threshold can have
large effects on the head-count.  The problem is compounded in
international studies by differences in income distribution.  Förster
(1994), for example, finds significant changes in relative low-income
rates between countries with different poverty thresholds.  (Although
his range - from 20 to 70 per cent of median income - is rather large,
particularly because incomes at the very bottom tend to be measured
with substantial error).
Secondly, head-counts show the incidence of poverty but say nothing
about the degree to which incomes fall below the poverty threshold.
This is often termed the ‘intensity’ of poverty.  (Although some
evidence can be gleaned by comparing head-counts against different
thresholds.)  Equal weight is given to people marginally below the
poverty line and to those whose incomes fall well short.  A measure
that captures the intensity of poverty is the average low-income gap:
the mean proportion of the poverty line by which the incomes of the
poor fall below the poverty threshold.  Multiplying the poverty rate
by the poverty gap gives a useful result, sometimes known as the
‘poverty index’.  This is the proportion of aggregate household income
that would be needed to bring the incomes of all the poor up to the
poverty threshold (see Atkinson, 1987 for an application).
An additional extension is to look at the distribution of income among
the poor.  The aim is to pick up any pockets of extreme poverty.  A
standard measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which varies
between zero (when all incomes are the same) and one (there is
complete inequality: one person has all the income).  Sen (1976, 1979)
combined the three measures - poverty rate, poverty gap and inequality
of low income - into a composite indicator of poverty incidence,
intensity and distribution.  Building on Sen’s analysis, a whole class of
poverty measures has been developed (known as ‘P-a’: see Foster,
Greer and Thorbecke, 1984).  The studies surveyed here report only
measures based on poverty head-counts.  We intend to explore these
alternative measures in future work, but these more complex
approaches demand greater data accuracy than simpler measures
(Kakwani, 1994).
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With these important issues of interpretation in mind, this chapter turns
to empirical results. It focuses on how the average incomes of the old
compare with the population’s living standards.
Figure 2.1 compares the incomes of elderly married couples with the
incomes of the rest of the population.  (It is derived from Johnson, 1998:
the underlying data sources are described in Appendix A.)  The unit of
analysis is the ‘nuclear family’: individual, spouse and any dependent
children.  Other people living in larger households are counted as separate
‘income units’.  Pensioners are defined as people aged 65 or over and
people aged 60-64 who are not working.
Figure 2.1  Pensioner incomes as a percentage of non-
pensioner incomes in eight countries, couples
The results are very similar for five countries, where pensioners’ incomes
are between 80 and 85 per cent of working-age families’.  The outliers
are France and Germany, with rather higher replacement rates, and
Australia, with lower relative pensioner incomes.  (Private pensions in
Australia are predominantly paid as lump sums rather than as an annuity
stream, raising some important measurement issues.)  The mean
replacement rate in the United Kingdom - 83 per cent - lies just below
the 85-per-cent average for all eight countries.
Figure 2.2, from Hauser (1998) is based mainly on Luxembourg Income
Study data, an international collection of household surveys.  Again,
Appendix A describes these data, which were mainly collected in the
2 THE RELATIVE INCOMES OF THE ELDERLY
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early 1990s.  The sample is very different from the other studies because
it is defined by receipt of a pension rather than by age or labour-market
status.  The sample (presumably) excludes the elderly who receive all
their income from social assistance and other government transfers (except
public pensions).  It will also exclude people of pension age who are in
work and do not receive a public pension because of earnings tests or
because they have deferred their pension.37   Finally, the sample also covers
only 65-74 year olds.
Figure 2.2  Incomes of 65-74 year olds as a percentage of
population average incomes in 14 countries
Pensioners in the United Kingdom appear to fare less well compared
with their counterparts overseas than they do in Johnson’s study.  The
United Kingdom lies near the bottom of the rankings, with a replacement
rate of 82 per cent compared with a mean of 92 per cent for the 14
countries.
The results of the next study, prepared for the OECD secretariat, are
presented in Disney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998) and Börsch-Supan
(1998).  These data relate mainly from the early and mid-1990s, although
the United Kingdom data are from 1988-89.38   As in Johnson’s study,
the focus is on the resources of the elderly and not on the incomes of
other members of their household.  Here, older people living with children
either are excluded from the analysis or the children’s incomes are
37 See Disney and Whitehouse (1999), Sections 8.3 and 8.4, for a description of the
rules regarding earnings tests and pension deferral.
38 This is because the authors used data from the R etirement Survey, which contains
more detailed information on households’ assets.
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ignored.39   The study gets round the equivalence-scale problem by
presenting results separately by marital status and by focusing on family-
unit rather than household income.
Figure 2.3  Pensioners’ incomes as a percentage of older
workers’ incomes in nine countries, couples
Figure 2.3 shows the incomes of pensioner couples (around age 67) relative
to couples where the head is aged around 55.  This method could reduce
or increase measured replacement rates compared with the analyses above,
which use a more general comparator.  First, pensioners in the first few
years after pensionable age tend in most countries to be richer than the
whole pensioner population (see below).  Secondly, middle-aged
households are generally richer than the total population and the total
population of working age.  These two effects work in opposite directions.
Thus, the overall impact is difficult to predict and will vary between
countries.
Again, there is substantial bunching of different countries’ replacement
rates, this time between 75 and 80 per cent.  The outliers are Germany,
with a slightly higher replacement rate, and the United Kingdom and
United States, with much lower relative pensioner incomes.  These results
are different from other studies, where France tended to be an outlier at
the top, and the United States tended to lie nearer the middle of the
39 Data for Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom cover elderly family
units not living with children; data for Australia and the Netherlands exclude children’s
resources.
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distribution.  This, however, is because the data for the United States are
based on gross income (before personal income tax) rather than net or
disposable income (after tax).  Since the personal income tax is progressive,
pensioners receive additional reliefs and public pensions are partially
exempted, average tax rates on pensioners are lower than tax rates on
workers.  This will understate the replacement rate in the United States
significantly.
Again, data for Australia under-state pensioners’ relative incomes because
of the difficulty of measuring the returns from private pensions, which
are mainly paid out as a lump-sum rather than an annuity income stream.
The United Kingdom - with a replacement rate of 64 per cent, compared
with a mean of 77 per cent across the nine countries - lies next to the
bottom of the rankings.
Another study from the OECD secretariat - Förster and Pellizzari (2000)
- also includes data on replacement rates.  This study equivalises incomes
by dividing them by the square root of household size.  It expresses
pensioner incomes as a percentage of the incomes of the population as a
whole.  The data are from the mid-1990s (mainly 1995 or thereabouts).
The United Kingdom lies a little below the middle of the fifteen countries
shown in Figure 2.4.  The replacement rate of 78 per cent is below the
mean of 83 per cent.
This study - since it presents detailed income data for many different age
groups - also allows us to look at the impact on the results of the choice
of comparator.  Some papers compare pensioners with the population as
a whole, some with non-pensioners and some with older workers.
Figure 2.4  Pensioners’ incomes as a percentage of population
incomes in 15 countries
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Figure 2.5 looks at the first and the last of these cases.  In all cases bar
Greece, the incomes of older people of working age (51-65 year olds)
are higher than population incomes, by an average of 12 per cent.  The
difference in the United Kingdom - eight per cent - is one of the smallest
(after Greece and similar to Austria).  In contrast, the older working-age
groups in the United States and Sweden have incomes around a quarter
larger than the population as a whole.
The result of these differences is some significant re-rankings of countries.
Sweden, for example, drops from fourth from the top to fourth from the
bottom and the United States from second to eighth.  The replacement
rate in the United Kingdom of 72 per cent is rather closer to the mean
(74 per cent).
Why do the incomes of older people of working age relative to the
population as a whole differ so much between countries?  There are two
main potential explanations.
First, differences in retirement behaviour and, so, in labour-force
participation rates of older working age groups.  Figure 2.6 shows the
different pattern of activity rates by age in a selection of OECD countries.
Figure 2.5  Pensioners’ incomes as a percentage of population
incomes and of older working age population incomes in 15
countries
We have assembled countries into three main groups.  The first group,
consisting of Nordic countries plus Japan and Switzerland, has relatively
late retirement.  In this group, half of 60-64 year olds are still economically
active.  At the other end of the spectrum is a group of countries with
much earlier retirement.  In these continental European countries, less
than half of 55-59 year olds are economically active and the labour-force
participation rate for 60-64 year olds is just 13 per cent.
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The United Kingdom has a very similar pattern to the United States,
with two-thirds of 55-59 year olds and around 40 per cent of 60-64 year
olds economically active.  Thus, there is no evidence that the relatively
low incomes of the older working-age population in the United Kingdom
can be explained by their low labour-force participation rates.
The second potential explanation for relatively low incomes of older
workers in the United Kingdom is the pattern of earnings with age.  The
United Kingdom appears to have a particularly pronounced inverted-U
shape to its age-earnings profile in cross-section data (see OECD, 1998,
Table 4.4), which indicates that the oldest workers have lower pay than
prime-age workers do.  This explanation therefore seems more plausible
than the structure of retirement behaviour.
Figure 2.6  Economic activity rates by age, 17 countries, 1995
We end this section by reporting the results of the previous DSS study of
pensioner incomes: Whiteford and Kennedy (1995).  This study was also
based on Luxembourg Income Study data, this time from the mid-1980s.
The United Kingdom ranks last in this study with a mean replacement
rate of 84 per cent compared with an average of 93 per cent for the nine
countries shown (Figure 2.7).  The rather worse performance of the
United Kingdom in this study relative to the previous ones could have
many explanations.  The difference with Hauser’s result is perhaps the
most informative, since both are based on Luxembourg Income Study
data, but on different waves.  This implies that the United Kingdom’s
replacement rate relative to other countries has improved over time.
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Figure 2.7  Pensioners’ incomes as a percentage of population
incomes in nine countries
Many of the studies presented above divide the results between different
age groups and between single and married pensioners.  These differences
have obvious policy implications.  For example, should the pension system
pay more to older than to younger pensioners?  What is the appropriate
level of survivors’ pensions relative to the pension paid to a couple?
Figure 2.8 shows the incomes of the elderly relative to older workers for
both married couples and single pensioners.  (It is based on the same
study as Figure 2.3.)  In the seven countries at the top of the chart,
couples have larger relative incomes than single pensioners do; the
countries are ranked from the largest to the smallest difference.  In the
United States, for example, the replacement rate is 62 per cent for couples
and 46 per cent for single pensioners.  At the other end of the scale,
single pensioners have higher replacement rates in Italy and the
Netherlands.  In the United Kingdom - as in most of the rest of the
countries - couples are better off than single pensioners are, but the
difference is not very large.
2.1  The effect of sex and
marital status
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Figure 2.8  Pensioners’ incomes as a percentage of older
workers’ incomes by marital status in nine countries
Figures 2.9 and 2.10, based on Johnson (1998) and Hauser (1998)
respectively, split the results by sex40  and compare single pensioners with
married couples.  These studies adjust family unit incomes - dividing
married couples’ incomes by 1.7, for example - to compare with a single
person’s income.  In contrast, Disney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998)
- the study on which Figure 2.8 draws - look at married couples and
single people directly, bypassing the ‘equivalisation’ problem.
Figure 2.9  Single pensioners’ incomes as a percentage of
married couples by sex in eight countries, equivalised
40 See also Mejer and Siermann (2000) for an analysis of gender differences in income
poverty of both the elderly and the population as a whole.
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Single women’s incomes are generally lower than married couples’ are.
The exceptions in Figure 2.10, as in Figure 2.9, are Italy and the
Netherlands.  Figure 2.10 also reports higher incomes for single women
in Germany and Luxembourg.  Single men typically fare better than
married couples.  In Figure 2.9, the exceptions are Australia, the United
Kingdom and the United States, but single men’s incomes are only
marginally lower (two to four per cent) than married couples’.  Figure
2.10 reports much higher incomes for single men in the United Kingdom
than for married couples and a similar pattern in Denmark and Ireland.
Figure 2.10  Single pensioners’ incomes as a percentage of
married couples by sex in 13 countries, equivalised
The most convincing explanation for these patterns is the difference in
structure of pension benefits.  Most of the continental European systems
pay the same absolute amount of pension benefits to a single man and a
married man with the same employment and earnings record.  One
consequence is that the equivalised incomes for married couples where
one partner has an incomplete contribution history are lower than for
single pensioners.  But the flat-rate systems of Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom (and the means-tested system in Australia) pay a higher
benefit to married couples where one partner (usually the wife in the
case of these cohorts) has accumulated little or no pension rights of her
own.  This means that replacement rates for single pensioners are much
closer to those of married couples than in other countries.  Johnson
(1998) posits another explanation for the relatively low incomes of single
women.  Many single female pensioners, especially those with few pension
rights of their own, live with others.  Since the means tests for social-
assistance benefits depend on household incomes, these single women
can have little if any entitlement to public transfers.  They therefore
often have little income of their own.
2.2  The effect of age
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Figure 2.11 shows that pensioner incomes tend to decline with age, with
the exceptions of Canada and Australia.  In most cases - particularly in
the pension systems of continental Europe, with comprehensive earnings
replacement - the decline results from a cohort effect.  When people
reach pension age, their benefit is determined by their past earnings,
which will be higher for younger cohorts.  Most schemes now index
pensions in payment to prices rather than wages.41   Since wages tend to
rise faster than prices, this implies that new retirees will have larger pension
entitlements than existing pensioners.
In other cases, the decline in incomes with age reflects the immaturity of
the system.  The United Kingdom is one example.  The second-tier
State Earnings-R elated Pension Scheme (SER PS) was only introduced
in 1978.  Benefits for successive cohorts of retirees are increasing rapidly,
and peaked only in 1998.  Only in another twenty years or more will all
pensioners have full, mature SER PS benefits for any periods they spent
contracted in to SER PS.  Thus, recently retired pensioners had an average
SER PS benefit of over £ 20 in 2000, compared with £ 3.30 for pensioners
as a whole.42   There has been a similar effect with occupational pensions.
A series of measures in the 1970s and 1980s improved the protection of
the pension rights of ‘early leavers’.43   The Department of Social Security’s
Pensioners’ Incomes Series, for example, shows an increase in real mean
occupational pension receipt of 162 per cent between 1979 and 1996-97
as successive cohorts of retirees received higher pensions.
Australia has the reverse pattern to other countries: older pensioners are
richer than younger ones.  This probably stems from the complex
behavioural effects of the means-tested system coupled with private
pension benefits mainly paid as lump sums.44
The effects are broadly similar for single pensioners of both sexes.  These
effects must be interpreted with caution, because younger single pensioners
are more likely to be never-married while older single pensioners are
typically widows (and, more rarely, widowers).  The age-profile of income
in Canada is downward sloping for single pensioners, closer to the pattern
observed in other countries.  In France in contrast, the profile is upward
sloping for single men.  Finally, in Italy and the Netherlands, single men’s
incomes decline much more rapidly with age than married couples’ do.
41 Germany indexes benefits to net wages, which, since contribution rates are increasing
because of the pressures of ageing, results in a slower increase in benefits than indexation
to gross wages.
42 Department of Social Security (2000g), page 15 and Table R P6.
43 See Whitehouse (1998), section III for a description.
44 See Creedy and Disney (1989, 1990).
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Figure 2.11  Pensioner incomes as a percentage of non-
pensioner incomes by age in eight countries, couples
What explains the pattern of declining pensioner income with age?  First,
most public pension systems now increase benefits automatically with
changes in the cost or standard of living.  However, older pensioners can
have lower incomes because of incomplete indexation in the past.  Private
pension benefits and annuity incomes are often unindexed or only partially
indexed.  Secondly, successive generations are richer because of economic
growth, known as a cohort effect.  With higher lifetime incomes, we
might expect each generation of pensioners to be richer than its
predecessors were.  Thirdly, women live longer than men do and women
pensioners tend to be poorer (Figure 6.4 discusses this problem further).
Fourthly, some of the decline in incomes with age reflects the role of
earnings among younger pensioners.  According to the Department of
Social Security’s Pensioners’ Incomes Series, recently retired pensioner
couples (where the man is aged 65-69) have gross incomes £ 100 a week
more than couples where the head of household is over 75.  Around half
of this difference - a little over £ 50 a week - is because of the higher
average earnings of the recently retired pensioners.  For single pensioners,
the effect is still more pronounced.  Earnings make up nearly 60 per cent
of the difference in incomes between recently retired pensioners and the
over 75s.  They account for nearly £ 30 a week of the total difference of
around £ 50 a week.  This is predominantly an age rather than a cohort
effect.  Nevertheless, only a small minority has income from earnings.
Among the recently retired, 23 per cent of couples and 16 per cent of
single pensioners had some income from earnings.  These proportions
are 15 per cent and 4 per cent respectively for couples and single pensioners
of all ages.  The pattern of average incomes by age is therefore distorted
by a small number of relatively well off younger elderly who are still
working.
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The apparent decline in incomes of older pensioners therefore results
from a series of complex effects and it is important, as we will argue in
the following Chapter, to look beyond simple income averages.  Following
pensioner incomes across time allows some of the cohort (date-of-birth)
effect to be disentangled from the age effect.  Johnson and Stears (1996)
find that cohort effects explain the decline in income with age in the
U nited Kingdom.  U nder- indexation of pension benefits and
decumulation of assets (which are predominantly age effects) explain only
a small part of the pattern.  The average income of each cohort in fact
increases over time.  Only some of this pattern can be explained by
features of the pension system: the rest can only be a result of differential
mortality.  This results in a compositional problem: the relatively rich
will be over-represented among the oldest pensioners because they tend
to live longer.
The analyses above were all based on relative measures of living standards:
the elderly in a particular country were compared with the population as
a whole in the same country.  However, this approach does not provide
for direct comparisons of absolute living standards.  How do pensioner
incomes overseas compare with overall living standards and those of
pensioners in the United Kingdom?
Such an analysis is complicated because exchange rates are very volatile.
Purchasing-power-parity exchange rates attempt to correct for this by
showing the exchange rate that would equalise the cost of a particular
basket of goods in a particular currency.  The results in Table 2.1 use the
OECD’s purchasing power parities for 1985, with different years’ results
deflated to 1985 prices in the relevant national currency.  A second
problem is that this analysis relies on a greater degree of comparability
between different countries’ data sources than does a study of pensioner
living standards relative to general incomes in the same country.
The results in Table 2.1 are shown as percentages of the population
equivalent mean income in the United Kingdom.  Countries are ranked
by their population mean income relative to the United Kingdom.  The
Netherlands, at the top, has an average population income of 83 per cent
of the United Kingdom level.  Citizens of the United States are 49 per
cent richer than those of the United Kingdom are.
The results show some rather different patterns to the replacement rate
data presented above.  Pensioners in Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden
have broadly similar incomes to British pensioners.  However, Canada
and the United States, which often had replacement rates among the
lowest, have the most prosperous pensioners in absolute terms.  Despite
the broader income distribution in North America compared with most
European countries, Canada’s lowest-income pensioners (the bottom
decile) are the best off and America’s have a similar absolute living standard
to the poorest pensioners in the United Kingdom.  French pensioners
2.3  Absolute living standards
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are also substantially better off than their British counterparts.  This is
explained in part by the fact that overall incomes are more than ten per
cent higher and in part, by the better relative position of pensioners.
Interestingly, the United Kingdom has (along with the Netherlands and
Sweden) among the most equal distribution of pensioner incomes.  The
central 80 per cent of pensioners in the United Kingdom lie between 51
and 131 per cent of the population mean.
Purchasing power parities are a macroeconomic concept: they adjust
GDP to reflect differences in purchasing power.  It is simple, of course,
to derive a microeconomic concept from this macroeconomic idea.  This
microeconomic measure is, however, GDP per capita.  In contrast, the
studies of income distribution here use a different equivalence scale (not
per-capita income).  Household size and composition vary between
countries, so the appropriate adjustment is not the GDP-based purchasing
power parity.
Table 2.1  Incomes of elderly and population adjusted by
purchasing power parity exchange rates as a percentage of
population mean income in the United Kingdom, ten
countries
Elderly Population
Bottom Top Bottom
Median Mean decile decile Median Mean decile
N etherlands 72 86 57 136 71 83 43
Italy 73 82 41 133 78 90 38
Sweden 76 82 54 117 95 97 55
United Kingdom 72 84 51 131 88 100 47
Australia 60 78 48 133 93 105 46
Germany 90 104 52 159 95 106 55
France 92 112 61 184 96 111 51
Luxembourg 103 114 57 184 111 123 68
Canada 102 122 68 205 124 137 61
United States 119 145 52 270 131 149 48
Source: W hiteford and Kennedy (1995), Table 3.19
N ote: the data are from between 1984 and 1987
Using micro datasets, it is possible to adjust OECD purchasing power
parities to take account of these differences.  R ainwater and Smeeding
(1999) estimate from Luxembourg Income Study data the ratio of mean
income per equivalent person to mean income per capita.  Figure 2.12
shows the results.  In the United Kingdom, equivalent income per person
is 2.15 times the mean income per person.  In Spain, families are larger
on average and there are fewer older people living alone.  This means
that Spanish living standards are some 24 per cent higher once we allow
for different family structure than they are on a per-capita basis.  At the
other end of the scale, family sizes are smaller in the Nordic countries
that they are in the United Kingdom.  In Sweden, for example, adjusting
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for different household size implies living standards are 12 per cent lower
than they are when measured with unadjusted purchasing power parities.
The effect of these adjustments on the results in Table 2.1 would be
large.  For example, pensioners in Britain would move well ahead of
Sweden and draw level with the Netherlands. However, Italian pensioners
would move from a living standard a little below those in the United
Kingdom to a level around 10 per cent ahead.
This simple analysis of potential adjustments to purchasing power parities
suggests that comparisons of absolute living standards should be treated
with caution.45
Figure 2.12  Equivalised purchasing power parities relative to
purchasing power parities on a per capita basis, 14 countries
This chapter has reported the results of several papers on ‘replacement
rates’: average pensioners’ incomes relative to general living standards.
This section assesses the robustness of the findings of these cross-country
studies and draws some preliminary conclusions.  Any analysis is
complicated by the different country coverage of the studies and the
disaggregation of the results in varying ways.
We compare the results of different studies pair-wise in a series of matrices.
The first line in each cell of the following tables shows the correlation
coefficient between the replacement rates reported for each overlapping
2.4  Summary and comparison
of findings
45 There are many other potential adjustments: for example, to use the median rather
than the mean person.  The more unequal a country’s overall income distribution,
the less accurate the mean as a guide to the living standards of the ‘typical’ person.  See
R ainwater and Smeeding (1999) and Brungger (1996).
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country in the relevant two studies.  The significance level, from a standard
test, is reported in parentheses.  (This tests the null hypothesis that the
two datasets are statistically related: thus, an entry at this point below
0.05 implies that the results from the two studies considered are statistically
indistinguishable.)  The second line in each cell reports the mean respective
replacement rate in the two studies that are compared.  The third line
reports the number of countries that the two relevant studies have in
common.  (Note that the means reported in each case are calculated only
for the countries that the two relevant studies have in common.)  The
final line shows the results for the United Kingdom.
We have included an extra study in this test of robustness of different
studies - that of Burniaux et al. (1999) - which was excluded from the
earlier analysis because it does not cover the United Kingdom.  However,
we feel that this offers a useful comparative benchmark for assessing the
other studies (that include the United Kingdom).
Table 2.2 compares the three studies that report a replacement rate for
the entire pensioner population.  The two OECD-based studies -
Burniaux and Förster46  - report essentially the same results.  The correlation
coefficient is 0.98 and the means are very similar for the nine countries
that are covered by both studies.  Neither, however, bears much
relationship to the earlier Whiteford study.  On the United Kingdom
specifically, the Whiteford study ranks the country lowest out of nine
countries in replacement-rate terms, while Förster ranks the United
Kingdom tenth out of 14 (see Table 2.7 below).
Table 2.2  Comparison matrix for replacement rates: all
pensioners, three studies
Förster W hiteford
Burniaux Correlation: 0.98 (0.00) Correlation: 0.31 (0.34)
Means: 85,84 Means: 89,96
O bservations: 9 O bservations: 6
UK: n/a, 78 UK: n/a, 84
Förster Correlation: 0.56 (0.15)
Means: 85,94
O bservations: 8
UK: 78,84
The next two tables compare studies that present replacement rates divided
by marital status.  These studies give different results.  Correlation
coefficients are generally low and always insignificant.  Means are wildly
different, as are the numerical results for the United Kingdom.  However,
46 Here and in the following tables, studies are referred to by the name of their leading
author alone.  Apologies to ‘subsequent’ authors.
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the United Kingdom consistently ranks towards the bottom of the
replacement rate table for both marital-status groups.
Table 2.3  Comparison matrix for replacement rates:
pensioner couples, three studies
Johnson W hiteford
Disney Correlation: 0.59 (0.17) Correlation: 0.20 (0.67)
Means: 74,85 Means: 76,96
O bservations: 7 O bservations: 7
UK: 64,83 UK: 54,83
Johnson Correlation: 0.43 (0.40)
Means: 88,97
O bservations: 6
UK: 83,84
Table 2.4  Comparison matrix for replacement rates:
single pensioners, two studies
W hiteford
Disney Correlation: 0.51 (0.24)
Means: 71,91
O bservations: 7
UK: 58,85
The following tables compare the studies that divide replacement rates
by age group.  There is a further split because Hauser reports results using
‘old-’ and ‘new-OECD’ scales (using his terminology).  Sticking with
the comparison between equivalence scales, the results are highly correlated
between countries: the choice between these two scales does not affect
the average living standards of pensioners relative to the population.  It
does, however, significantly affect the mean replacement rate.  This is an
important result that deserves to be explored further.
Comparing Hauser’s with other results presented on a similar basis reveals
some closer correlations than exhibited previously, although only for
younger pensioners.
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Table 2.5  Comparison matrix for replacement rates: age
65-74, four studies
Hauser (old scale) Hauser (new scale) W hiteford
Förster Correlation: 0.76 Correlation: 0.80 Correlation: 0.78
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Means: 87,92 Means: 88,86 Means: 89,94
O bservations: 11 O bservations: 10 O bservations: 10
UK: 80,82 UK: 80,76 UK: 80,85
Hauser Correlation: 0.99 Correlation: 0.78
(old scale) (0.00) (0.01)
Means: 93,86 Means: 95,96
O bservations: 12 O bservations: 9
UK: 82,76 UK: 82,85
Hauser Correlation: 0.79 (0.01)
(new scale) Means: 88,97
O bservations: 9
UK: 76,85
Table 2.6  Comparison matrix for replacement rates: age 75
plus, five studies
Hauser Hauser Johnson W hiteford
(old scale) (new scale)
Förster Correlation: 0.53 Correlation: 0.55 Correlation: 0.24 Correlation: 0.13
(0.10) (0.09) (0.60) (0.74)
Means: 71,98 Means: 78,77 Means: 82,82 Means: 80,86
O bservations: 11 O bservations: 10 O bservations: 7 O bservations: 9
UK: 74,71 UK: 74,65 UK: 74,75 UK: 74,80
Hauser
(old scale) Correlation: 0.99 Correlation: 0.40 Correlation: 0.41
(0.00) (0.45) (0.35)
Means: 87,78 Means: 87,82 Means: 88,89
O bservations: 12 O bservations: 7 O bservations: 9
UK: 71,65 UK: 71,75 UK: 71,80
Hauser
(new scale) Correlation: 0.35 Correlation: 0.35
(0.38) (0.26)
Means: 79,82 Means: 79,89
O bservations: 7 O bservations: 9
UK: 65,75 UK: 65,80
Johnson Correlation: 0.74
(0.04)
Means: 81,87
O bservations: 8
UK: 75,80
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Unfortunately, the overlap of the different studies that we have surveyed
is limited both because different countries are covered and because results
are presented in different ways.  The pair-wise comparisons in this section
have shown that it is very difficult to draw robust conclusions about the
relative position of British pensioners compared with their counterparts
overseas.  We end the chapter by showing the United Kingdom’s position
in the league table of pensioner replacement rates in different studies
(Table 2.7).  Unfortunately, different disaggregations in different studies
(and the absence of data on the weights of different sex, marital status and
age groups) prevent us from completing all cells in the Table.
The United Kingdom is mainly towards the bottom.  The ranking in
each study should be used with caution because there is often substantial
clustering of countries around similar replacement rates.  Given the high
degree of measurement error in such studies, the exact position in the
league table cannot be seen as accurate.
Table 2.7  United Kingdom ranking in five studies of
pensioner replacement rates
All Couples Single 65-74 75-
D isney 8/9 8/9
Förster 11/15 11/16 10/15
Hauser 11/14, 12/14,
10/12 11/12
Johnson 6/8 6/8 4/8,7/8 6/8
W hiteford 9/9 9/9 8/9 10/11 9/11
N ote: the two lines for Hauser refer to the ‘old-’ and ‘new-O ECD ’ equivalence scales respectively.  Since
the replacement rates for countries are often closely clustered, the exact rankings should be interpreted
with caution.
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‘Beware of the mean’, warns Quinn (1987), in the title of his study of the
economic status of the elderly in the United States.  Chapter 2 looked
only at pensioners’ average incomes. However, that analysis disguises a
large degree of dispersion between different pensioners’ economic
circumstances in a single country.  This distinction is extremely important
from a public policy perspective.  A small number of pensioners with a
very high income - by way of illustration - will generate a high mean
pensioner income, but this may disguise a large number of pensioners
with very modest means.  This chapter is wary of the mean: it looks at
the position of pensioners in the income distribution as a whole.
Figure 3.1 shows the position of pensioners in the population income
distribution (drawn from Johnson, 1998).  The population has been
divided into tenths (or deciles), from the poorest tenth to the richest.  If
pensioners’ incomes were to match the pattern of the population, then a
tenth of pensioners would obviously be in each of the population deciles.
Hence, Figure 3.1 draws the scale through the ten-per-cent level.  Bars
above the line mean that pensioners are over-represented in that income
decile; and bars below the line, that they are under-represented.
The patterns are remarkably similar between many countries.  Pensioners
tend to be under-represented in the bottom one or two deciles; that is,
the poorest groups in society.  Typically, pensioners are then over-
represented in the following few deciles, up to the fourth, fifth or six.
Finally, there are generally disproportionately few pensioners in the highest
income deciles.
As might be expected, the profile is much flatter in countries with
comprehensive old-age social insurance programmes, such as France,
Germany and Italy.  A much greater concentration of pensioners in the
low-to-mid deciles is observed in Australia, which has a means-tested
public pension system.  There is a similar pattern in Canada, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom - with predominantly flat-rate
public schemes - and in the United States, where the public pension plan
has a highly progressive formula.  Each of these systems pays either only
a little more, no more or less to pensioners who had higher earnings
during their working lives.  The result is generally a lower proportion of
pensioners at the very bottom of the income distribution, but rather
fewer with incomes in the top half of the population distribution.
THE POSITION OF PENSIONER INCOMES IN THE POPULATION
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
3
38
Figure 3.1  Percentage of pensioners in each decile of the
population income distribution in eight countries, equivalised
We noted in Chapter 1 that these studies ignore the extra costs of disability
faced by some groups.  This is, of course, likely to be an important issue
for the elderly, where morbidity rates are much higher than for the
working-age population.  The extra costs of disability are recognised in
the benefit system of the United Kingdom.  Recipients of disability benefits
are much less likely to be in the lowest quintile of the population income
distribution (13 per cent) than pensioners as a whole (27 per cent), because
of their extra benefit entitlement.47  Nevertheless, it is not possible to
adjust incomes for the extra cost of disability, and so there is a danger in
overstating the incomes of the disabled.
We have deepened our analysis of pensioner incomes in this chapter by
looking at their distribution of income compared with the population as
a whole.  The distribution in the United Kingdom is very similar to
other Anglo-Saxon countries - Australia, Canada and the United States -
and the Netherlands and, to a slightly lesser extent, Germany.
47 Department of Social Security (2000d), Table 7.5.
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This chapter focuses on the poorest groups rather than the income
distribution as a whole.  The first part looks at pensioner poverty rates:
the proportion of the elderly with incomes below a specific poverty
threshold.  As discussed in the chapter on measurement issues, the poverty
lines are relative.  Some studies define poverty as having an income in
the bottom quintile of the population income distribution, others relative
to some proportion of the population mean or median income.  The
second part of this chapter reports poverty shares: the proportion of people
below the poverty threshold that is elderly.
These measures are complementary.  The second sheds light mainly on
the inter-generational distribution of income: what priority should be
placed on policies to attack poverty among the elderly relative to poverty
of other groups, such as families with children?  The first informs both
inter- and intra-generational questions: does the pension system protect
the elderly poor and is the distribution of pension benefits ‘equitable’ or
‘fair’?
Note that we use the term ‘poverty’ as shorthand for groups on low
incomes, although we acknowledge that in reality poverty encompasses
many more dimensions of deprivation and social exclusion, as discussed
in Chapter 1.
The analysis of low incomes begins with a study that measures poverty of
the elderly as the proportion of pensioners with incomes in the bottom
quintile of the population income distribution.  Figure 4.1, from Johnson
(1998), summarises the more complete data from Figure 3.1.  The intercept
of the chart is now drawn at 20 per cent: so bars to the right imply the
elderly are over-represented among the poor and to the left, that the
elderly are under-represented.  In most countries, the proportion of the
elderly in the bottom quintile of incomes is close to the ‘neutral’ level of
20 per cent.  Canada shows the highest degree of over-representation.
In five countries, however, fewer than one in five pensioners are in the
bottom quintile.  The United Kingdom - with a score of 22 per cent -
lies just above the mean for the eight countries in the study.
4 MEASURES OF INCOME POVERTY
4.1  Income poverty rates
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Figure 4.1 Pensioner income poverty rates in eight
countries:percentage of elderly in the bottom quintile of the
population income distribution
The other international studies surveyed here have used alternative
thresholds for poverty to the bottom quintile of the population income
distribution.48   Figure 4.2 is based on a definition of poverty as having an
income below half of the population mean income.  This measure is
more robust with respect to changes in the shape of the overall income
distribution than the bottom-quintile measure.  For example, a higher
proportion in the bottom quintile of a more equal income distribution
might generate higher measured poverty.  However, this might mean
that pensioners are relatively better off than their counterparts in a country
with a more dispersed distribution of income.  Unfortunately, however,
this measure has no simple comparator, whereas whether the proportion
of pensioners in the bottom quintile exceeds 20 per cent or not gives a
quick indication of whether the elderly are over- or under-represented
among the poor.  In addition, measuring incomes relative to the mean
leaves the results vulnerable to the effect of outliers and measurement
error.
Figure 4.2 shows that the United Kingdom has the second highest pension
poverty rate with nearly a quarter of pensioners found to have incomes
below half the average.
48 Burniaux et al. (1998) also count people as poor if they lie in the bottom quintile of
the overall income distribution but their results do not cover the United Kingdom
and so are excluded from our detailed analysis here.
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Figure 4.2  Pensioner income poverty rates in 14 countries:
percentage of pensioners with incomes below half population
mean
Figure 4.3 extends the analysis of this study by using three different poverty
thresholds: incomes of 40, 50 and 60 per cent of the population mean.
Naturally, a higher threshold increases measured poverty.  An average of
six per cent of pensioners have incomes under 40 per cent of the population
mean, 13 per cent are under the 50-per-cent threshold and 24 per cent
count as poor with a 60-per-cent poverty line.
There are some significant re-rankings in countries’ relative poverty rates
(under the chosen definition of poverty) with the different poverty lines.
In the United Kingdom, nine per cent of pensioners have incomes below
40 per cent of average, the fifth highest proportion.  However, with a
60-per-cent threshold, the United Kingdom has the highest measured
elderly poverty rate (at 40 per cent).  Similarly, Denmark has the second
lowest poverty rate with the lowest threshold but moves up six places
with the higher poverty line.
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Figure 4.3  Pensioner income poverty rates in 14 countries:
proportion of pensioners with incomes below specified
proportions of population mean
Other countries have very similar positions whichever the choice of
threshold.  Moreover, the results with different poverty lines are strongly
related, as the following correlation matrix shows:
40% 50% 60%
40% 1 —  —  
50% 0.95 1 —  
60% 0.88 0.95 1 
The next three studies are also based on Luxembourg Income Study
data.  Figure 4.4 draws on Bradshaw and Chen (1996).  It shows the
percentage of elderly households with incomes below half of the
population mean income.  The United Kingdom has a much higher
pensioner poverty rate than most other countries in this paper.  We
suspect that the main reason for this result is the exclusion of housing
benefit from the measure of income.49   We return to the issue of differing
policies on subsidised housing below in the section on in-kind incomes.
However, it is worth noting here that this treatment is unique to the
Bradshaw-Chen study.  All other papers surveyed here define income as
all cash income and ‘near-cash’ income, where the latter specifically
includes, for example, housing benefit in the United Kingdom and food
stamps in the United States.  Given the importance of housing benefits
to poorer pensioners in the United Kingdom - some 17 per cent of all
pensioners receive the benefit - it is unsurprising that this treatment
has a significant effect on measured poverty rates.
49 The authors are not transparent, but they state: ‘Excluded from consideration here are
the impacts of housing benefits and subsidies…’ (p. 4).
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Figure 4.4  Pensioner income poverty rates in 13 countries:
percentage of pensioner couples with incomes below half
population mean
Figure 4.5 shows the pensioner poverty rate from Atkinson, R ainwater
and Smeeding (1995).  Again, poverty is defined as an income below half
of the population average.  Here, in stark contrast to the previous study,
the United Kingdom lies very close to the bottom of the scale.  The
pensioner poverty rate is under seven per cent, compared with an average
of over 11 per cent for the 16 countries analysed.  (Poverty rates relative
to a higher threshold - 70 per cent of average income - are shown in
Appendix B.)
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Figure 4.5  Pensioner income poverty rates in 16 countries:
percentage of pensioner couples with incomes below half
population mean
These results are similar to the earlier report for the Department of Social
Security that was also based on Luxembourg Income Study data:
Whiteford and Kennedy (1995).  Figure 4.6 shows the pensioner poverty
rate in the 11 countries covered by this study.
Whiteford and Kennedy, like Hauser, also use a higher and a lower poverty
threshold (of 40 and 60 per cent of average income respectively).  The
correlation matrix between the poverty rates relative to these different
thresholds again suggests that the choice of cut-off income is generally
not important, although the different results are not as close as in Hauser’s
study:
40% 50% 60%
40% 1 —  —  
50% 0.76 1 —  
60% 0.51 0.91 1 
As in Hauser’s study, the United Kingdom has lower poverty rates relative
to lower than to higher thresholds.  The United Kingdom has the
third and fourth lowest pensioner poverty rate with a cut-off of 40 and
50 per cent respectively.  However, if poverty is defined as an income
below 60 per cent of the average, then the United Kingdom slips to
eighth place.
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Figure 4.6  Pensioner income poverty rates in 11 countries:
percentage of pensioner couples with incomes below half
population mean
We end the analysis of poverty rates with the most recent study.  Figure
4.7 shows the proportion of pensioners with incomes below half the
average in 16 OECD countries as reported by Förster and Pellizzari (2000).
The United Kingdom lies around the middle of the distribution with a
poverty rate two percentage points below the average for all the countries
surveyed.
Figure 4.7  Pensioner income poverty rates in 16 countries:
percentage of pensioner couples with incomes below half
population mean
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Table 4.1 compares the studies that define poverty as having an income
below half the average that were presented in the charts above.  Five
of these analyses are based on the Luxembourg Income Study: those
described as Atkinson, Bradshaw, Hauser, Smeeding and Whiteford.
In general, they proffer similar results.  The correlation coefficients for
poverty rates are positive and relatively high: some are significant on
standard tests.  Moreover, mean poverty rates in the countries that
overlap are similar.50   In two of these studies, the United Kingdom has
a relatively low poverty rate (seven and eight per cent respectively).
However, in Bradshaw and Hauser, the United Kingdom has a very
high poverty rate (36 and 23 per cent respectively).  We have already
noted that the Bradshaw study appears to exclude housing benefit from
the measure of income in the United Kingdom, a treatment not shared
by the other analyses.  The main idiosyncrasy of the Hauser paper is in
the definition of a pensioner: all members (irrespective of their own
age) of households headed by someone aged 55 or over in which one
or more member receives a pension.  The other studies simply count
people as elderly using a standard cut-off age and do not count other
members of households that contain a pensioner.  There are many
different effects of this treatment and so it is difficult to isolate which
might be responsible for the rather different result for the United
Kingdom.
The correlation between these Luxembourg Income Study results and
the most recent OECD analysis - labelled Förster, based on responses
from national experts - is generally reasonable.  The only exception is,
again, Bradshaw and Chen’s paper.
Table 4.2 summarises different studies’ assessment of pensioner poverty
in the United Kingdom relative to other countries.  One interesting
result - which appears common to the three studies that use different
proportions of average income as the poverty threshold - is that the
United Kingdom looks worse the higher is the poverty line.
The results vary enormously.  Some put the United Kingdom at the
bottom of the rankings; that is, with the highest pensioner poverty rate.
O thers paint a rather different picture, with many fewer British
pensioners in poverty than their counterparts overseas.  If, however,
we exclude the Bradshaw and Hauser studies - on account of their
idiosyncratic definitions of income and pensioners respectively - then
the United Kingdom appears to be in the middle to the bottom of the
rankings.
50 Comparisons of poverty rates relative to other levels of income can be found in
Appendix B.
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Table 4.2 Comparison matrix for poverty rates: proportion of pensioners with incomes
below half average
Bradshaw Förster Hauser Smeeding W hiteford
Atkinson Correlation: 0.30 Correlation: 0.71 Correlation: 0.49 Correlation: 0.84 Correlation: 0.94
(0.37) (0.00) (0.15) (0.07) (0.00)
Means: 11, 15 Means: 11,11 Means: 10,12 Means: 14,16 Means: 11,12
O bservations: 11 O bservations: 13 O bservations: 10 O bservations: 5 O bservations: 11
UK:7,36 UK: 7,12 UK: 7,23 UK: 7,n/a UK: 7,8
Bradshaw Correlation: 0.46 Correlation: 0.64 Correlation: 0.88 Correlation: 0.56
(0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12)
Means: 14,11 Means: 15,13 Means: 18,16 Means: 16,13
O bservations: 12 O bservations: 10 O bservations: 5 O bservations: 9
UK: 36,11 UK: 36,23 UK: 36,n/a UK: 36,8
Förster Correlation: 0.69 Correlation: 0.80 Correlation: 0.74
(0.02) (0.11) (0.01)
Means: 13,12 Means: 11,16 Means: 11,12
O bservations: 11 O bservations: 5 O bservations: 10
UK: 12, 23 UK: 12, n/a UK: 12,8
Hauser Correlation: 0.99 Correlation: 0.52
(0.07) (0.15)
Means: 12,13 Means: 12,11
O bservations: 3 O bservations: 9
UK: 23,n/a UK: 23,8
Smeeding Correlation: 0.99 (0.00)
Means: 17,19
O bservations: 4
UK: n/a,8
Table 4.1  United Kingdom ranking in six studies of
pensioner poverty rates
Definition of poverty
Bottom Proportion of average income
quintile 40% 50% 60% 70%
Atkinson 3/16 14/16
Bradshaw 14/14
Förster 9/16
Hauser 10/14 13/14 14/14
Johnson 6/8
W hiteford 3/11 4/11 8/11
Whiteford and Kennedy (1995) also survey the results of papers based
on earlier waves of Luxembourg Income Study data.  Appendix B
includes a comparison of these with the main studies analysed in this
paper.
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A second presentation of income poverty data looks at the proportion
of the poor that is elderly, rather than the proportion of the elderly
that is poor as in the income poverty rates above.  Measures of the
pensioner poverty share have clear and important implications for the
focus of public policies to reduce poverty.  The pensioner poverty
share is closely related to the poverty rate, but it also depends on the
elderly’s share of the population as a whole.
The first chart is drawn from Bradshaw and Chen (1996).  We have
already noted that this study is something of an outlier.  The United
Kingdom, where more than 40 per cent of the poor are reported as being
elderly, is at the top of the chart.
Figure 4.8  Pensioner income poverty shares in 13 countries:
pensioners as a percentage of people with incomes below half
population average
Atkinson, R ainwater and Smeeding (1995), in contrast, find that the
United Kingdom has one of the lowest pension poverty shares: the third
lowest, at just under 17 per cent (Figure 4.9).  This is substantially below
pensioners’ share of the population as a whole.
4.2  Income poverty shares
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Figure 4.9  Pensioner income poverty shares in 14 countries:
pensioners as a percentage of people with incomes below
half population average
The results of a more recent study for the OECD - Förster and Pellizzari
(2000) - are shown in Figure 4.10.  The United Kingdom is ranked in
the bottom half of the distribution with a pensioner poverty share of 15
per cent, well below the average.
Figure 4.10  Pensioner income poverty shares in 16 countries:
pensioners as a percentage of people with incomes below half
population average
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The summary Table shows some correspondence between the different
studies with the exception of Bradshaw.  Förster reports a lower average
poverty share than the other studies, although his figure for the United
Kingdom is close to Atkinson’s.  These two studies both point to a low-
to-middle pensioner poverty share in the United Kingdom.
Table 4.3  Comparison matrix for poverty shares: pensioners
as a percentage of the population with incomes under half
average
Bradshaw Burniaux Förster
Atkinson Correlation: 0.39 Correlation: 0.06 Correlation: 0.58
(0.27) (0.89) (0.05)
Means: 25,25 Means: 24,22 Means: 24,17
O bservations: 10 O bservations: 8 O bservations: 12
UK: 17,41 UK: 17,n/a UK: 17,15
Bradshaw Correlation: 0.27 Correlation: 0.44
(0.48) (0.15)
Means: 24,26 Means: 25,16
O bservations: 9 O bservations: 12
UK: 41,n/a UK: 41,15
Burniaux Correlation: 0.49
(0.15)
Means: 25,17
O bservations: 10
UK: n/a,15
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This chapter focuses on the distribution of income among pensioners.
Figure 5.1 shows a simple measure of income inequality: the ratio of the
90th percentile of the pensioner income distribution to the 10th percentile,
called the 90/ 10 ratio for short.  The differences between countries are
very large.  In the United States, for example, the richest pensioners have
incomes more than five times larger than the poorest pensioners, while
the ratio is only two-and-a-half in Australia.  The size of the ratio in the
United States probably reflects the more dispersed distribution of income
and earnings generally.  The explanation for the pattern in other countries
is probably the different structure of the public pension system.  The
means-tested Australian pension, for example, results in a very equitable
distribution of income for pensioners.  Canada, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom pay mainly flat-rate public pension benefits, which
gives them a lower 90/ 10 ratio than Italy and France, which have
comprehensive earnings-related public pensions paying larger benefits to
higher earners.
Figure 5.1  Pensioner income inequality in eight countries:
ratio of 90th percentile of pension income to 10th percentile,
couples
Johnson (1998) also produces 90/ 10 ratios separately by sex, marital status
and age.  Typically, the incomes of single men are the most broadly
distributed - with the exceptions of Australia and the United Kingdom,
where couples’ incomes are the most dispersed - but the differences are
not large.  The pattern is also similar for different age groups.  The only
exceptions here are Italy, with a large decline in the 90/ 10 ratio with
age, and the United Kingdom, with a modest fall.  Johnson also analyses
60-64 year olds who are not in work.  This age group has vastly more
PENSIONER INCOME INEQUALITY5
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unequal incomes than people over pension age in Canada and the United
States.  This tends to suggest that there are ‘two nations’ of early retirees:
those forced to retire on low incomes because of illness or redundancy
and those with generous private pensions and early retirement benefits.
Figure 5.2 shows the same measure of pensioner income inequality drawn
from the recent OECD study, Förster and Pellizzari (2000).  This study
covers a broader range of countries.  In the eight countries covered by
both this paper and by Johnson’s, the correlation between the results is
near perfect (0.99, significance level 0.00).  The 90/ 10 ratio in the United
Kingdom is reported as 3.1 and 3.3 respectively.  Again, the United
States has a very high 90/ 10 ratio, as does Greece (which Johnson does
not cover).  Again, France, Germany and Italy exhibit greater pensioner
income inequality on this measure than the United Kingdom.
Figure 5.2  Pensioner income inequality in 16 countries:
ratio of 90th percentile of pensioner income to 10th
percentile, couples
Figure 5.3 takes a different approach to the analysis of the pensioner
income distribution.  It shows pension replacement rates for different
quintiles of the income distribution.  Pension replacement rates for the
poorest fifth are typically near to 100 per cent, although they are rather
larger in Germany and the United States and much lower in Italy.  Again,
the difference in patterns reflects the philosophy of different countries’
pension systems.  Flat-rate and means-tested public pensions, designed to
ensure that all pensioners have an adequate minimum income, deliver
high replacement rates at the bottom of the income distribution but
much lower levels of income replacement at the top.  This is apparent in
the results for Australia and the United Kingdom.  The decline in
replacement rates with income in the United States reflects the progressive
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structure of the pension benefit formula.  Italy exhibits the opposite pattern:
replacement rates are close to flat across the income range.
Income inequality among pensioners shows very similar patterns between
different studies, unlike the measures of replacement rates, poverty and
so on that we analysed before.  The inequality of pensioner incomes in
the United Kingdom lies roughly in the middle.  There are two main
explanations for the differences between countries.  First, the degree of
inequality among the working age population is reflected in inequality
among pensioners.  This probably explains why the United States has a
large 90/ 10 ratio while the Nordic countries have a lower result.  The
second explanation is the structure of public pension systems.  Insurance-
based pension systems, such as those in France, Germany and Italy, give
bigger pensions to people who were higher earners during their working
life.  The countries with lower 90/ 10 ratios often have large means-
tested or flat-rate components in their pension systems.  This includes
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands.
These results are an important complement to the analyses in earlier
chapters.  The countries with low 90/ 10 ratios often have lower average
pensioner replacement rates.  This implies that many cross-country
differences in the average living standard of pensioners are generated by
the incomes of the richest pensioners rather than by the incomes of the
majority.
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Figure 5.3  Pensioner incomes as a percentage of non-
pensioner incomes by income quintile in nine countries
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The last four chapters have looked at pensioners’ incomes in cross-section,
that is, in a single year.  Here we extend the analysis to look at how these
patterns have changed over time.
Figure 6.1 is based on three years’ data drawn from the Luxembourg
Income Study.51   Generally, the first year’s results are from in the mid-
1970s, the second from around 1980 and the third from the early-to-mid
1990s.  In all three countries bar the United Kingdom, pensioners’ incomes
have grown significantly faster than the incomes of the population as a
whole.52   In Sweden, the income growth rate for pensioners in each of
the three age groups is around 1½ per cent a year faster than the growth
of median population income.  The differential in the United States is
around one per cent a year.  In Canada, the incomes of the oldest old (75
and over) have grown much faster relative to the population - around
3½ per cent a year - than younger age groups.  For 65-69 year olds, the
income growth differential is around 0.8 per cent a year and a little over
1½ per cent a year for 70-74 year olds.
The United Kingdom shows a different pattern, with pensioner incomes
increasing at the same rate or slightly slower than the population average
in the late 1970s.  During the 1980s, however, pensioners of all age
groups gained ground, with incomes of 65-74 year olds increasing one
per cent a year faster than population incomes.
Over time, these differences in annual growth rates have cumulated into
sizeable income gains for the elderly relative to the population as whole.
In Canada, for example, incomes of the over 75s doubled relative to
population incomes between 1975 and 1994.  In Sweden, the average
pensioner income was around 30 per cent higher relative to population
incomes in the early 1990s than it had been in the mid 1970s.  In the
United States, the increase exceeds 20 per cent.  Even in the United
Kingdom, the growth in relative incomes in the 1980s meant that
pensioners were nearly 10 per cent better off in 1991 than in 1974,
compared with the population as a whole.
6 INCOME TRENDS
6.1  Trends in pensioner
incomes
51 See also Coder, Smeeding and Torrey (1990).
52 It should, however, be noted that national data sources - the Department of Social
Security’s Pensioners’ Incomes Series and Johnson and Stears (1995), for example -
show rather faster income growth for pensioners in the United Kingdom, as does the
OECD study discussed below.
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Figure 6.1  Income trends in four countries: median incomes of the elderly relative to the
population median
Förster and Pellizzari (2000) provide a broader analysis of the trend in the
relative incomes of the elderly, covering 13 countries.  The data compare
the mid-1990s with the mid-1980s.  Table 6.1 gives the results as the
percentage change in the replacement rate over the decade or so.53
Pensioners’ incomes increased faster than those of the population as a
whole did in nine of the 13 countries.  The mean change is a two per
cent increase in the replacement rate.  The elderly in the United Kingdom
seem to have done particularly well, with an increase in the replacement
rate of over five per cent: the fourth highest increase, and close to Canada,
France and Germany, which also show large gains.  The sizeable decline
in pensioners’ relative incomes in Ireland is probably a reflection of the
rapid growth of the economy, which has seen large increases in earnings.
53 Förster and Pellizzari report the results as absolute percentage point changes in the
replacement rate.  Here they have been transformed to (relative) percentage changes.
The original data are presented only for the two age groups separately.  Data for all
pensioners have been derived using 1990s levels and 1980s-to-1990s changes in
population shares to provide the relevant weights for averaging across the two age
groups.
Canada Sweden
United StatesUnited Kingdom
Source: Smeeding and Sulivan (1998), Appendix Table 1
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Table 6.1  Percentage change in replacement rate by age
group between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s in 13
countries
Change in replacement rate (%)
All Age 65-74 Age 75-
Canada 6.0 8.5 0.7
D enmark 4.0 6.5 1.4
Finland 1.5 1.7 1.1
France 6.3 8.6 1.4
Germany 5.5 8.9 1.2
Greece -2.9 -5.7 0.0
Ireland -6.9 -9.2 1.4
Italy 3.0 3.6 1.9
N etherlands -1.8 -2.9 0.8
N orway 4.3 8.6 2.3
Sweden 3.9 6.4 -1.6
United Kingdom 5.4 8.0 1.0
United States -0.7 -0.3 0.9
Source: authors’ calculations based on Förster and Pellizzari (2000), Table 2.3
N ote: see Appendix Table A.10 for a list of the exact years for which the data are drawn
Income changes in virtually all the countries vary significantly between
the two age groups.  In nine of the 13 nations, gains are much larger for
younger pensioners than for the over 75s.  The gain for the younger
pensioners averages two percentage points higher than for the older age
group.  In the United Kingdom, younger pensioners saw an eight per
cent increase in their incomes relative to the population as a whole,
compared with only one per cent for the over 75s.  As we have discussed
elsewhere, this is probably a cohort effect arising from the maturing of
SER PS and occupational pension benefits.  Other countries, such as
Canada, Germany and Sweden, however, exhibit still greater differences
in replacement rates between the age groups.
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Figure 6.2  Interpreting changes in the incomes of the elderly
over time: the effect of compositional changes
Comparisons of pensioners’ incomes over time can be distorted by
changes in the composition of elderly households.  Improvements in
life expectancy, even if enjoyed equally by different groups, will change
the distribution of pensioners, for example, between single men, single
women and married couples.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the Department of Social
Security’s Pensioners’ Incomes Series seems to contain an odd paradox.
Both pensioner couples’ and single pensioners’ net incomes were 60
per cent higher on average in 1996-97 than they were in 1979, but
pensioners’ incomes as a whole grew by 64 per cent.  The answer to
this apparent riddle is compositional change: if the proportion of
couples and singles is kept the same as in 1979, the overall pensioner
income growth rate is 60 per cent.  Fewer than 48 per cent of
pensioners were in couples in the early 1960s, rising to over 55 per
cent in the early 1990s, despite the growth in divorce over the period
(Goodman and Webb, 1994, Table 3.1).
There is, perhaps more surprisingly, a compositional effect of this sort
on recently retired pensioners’ incomes (people in the first five years
after state pension age).  The unadjusted growth in net incomes from
1979 to 1996-97 was 75 per cent.  Adjusting for compositional changes,
the growth rate was 72 per cent.
This, of course, raises another compositional effect in time series
comparisons: the ageing of the old.  Section 2.2 showed that pensioner
incomes tend to decline with age, both because of cohort effects on
lifetime income and earnings and because of the maturing of pension
schemes over time.  Measured average incomes of pensioners are likely
to be depressed over time as the proportion of older pensioners, with
lower average incomes, increases as longevity increases.  Unfortunately,
the data source used in this example has insufficient information to
permit correction for age compositional changes.
Figure 6.3 shows that the widespread increase in pensioner prosperity
found in Figure 6.1 was, in most countries, broadly based.  The proportions
of pensioners with low incomes fell very dramatically in Canada, from
25-40 per cent (depending on age) in the mid 1970s to under 10 per cent
by the mid 1990s.  In Sweden and the United Kingdom, declines in
pensioner income poverty rates in the late 1970s were partially reversed
in the 1980s.  Nevertheless, poverty rates for all age groups were still
lower at the end of the period than at the beginning.  A similar pattern is
observed for 70-74 year olds in the United States, but poverty rates
consistently declined for younger and older groups.
6.2  Trends in pensioner
income poverty
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Figure 6.3  Poverty trends in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and United States:
proportion of the elderly with incomes below half the population median, mid 1970s to mid
1990s
Figure 6.4  Income and consumption based measures
The advantages and disadvantages of expenditure as a measure of
welfare were set out in Section 1.4.  This figure presents some results
for the United Kingdom to illustrate how very different the relative
economic status of the elderly looks when measured using consumption
rather than income.
Pensioner income-poverty rates and shares have declined sharply in
the United Kingdom as in most OECD countries.  In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, pensioners made up around 40 per cent of the bottom
income decile, but this fell sharply in the early 1980s and again in the
early 1990s to reach 17 per cent by 1993. (Goodman, Johnson and
Webb, 1997; Goodman and Webb, 1995).  There are proportionately
more pensioners in the bottom decile of household expenditure.  From
the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the elderly share of the low-spending
group was around a half.  This fell to 40 per cent in the early 1980s,
but the late 1980s consumption boom seems to have led to a
divergence.  The proportion of the old in the bottom spending decile
increased again to a peak of 50 per cent.  This was reversed in the
early 1990s.
However, the important message is that the improvement in the
economic position of Britain’s elderly measured with expenditure
looks much smaller than measured with income.
Canada Sweden
United StatesUnited Kingdom
Source: Smeeding and Sulivan (1998), Appendix Table 1
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This section shows how the distribution of pensioner incomes has changed
over time.  This is the time-series counterpart to the cross-national
comparison of income distributions in Chapter 5.
Continuing with the focus on the United Kingdom, Figure 6.5 compares
incomes across a 30 year period: from 1961-62 to 1991-92.  The left-
hand bar shows how much higher the incomes of the poorest ten per
cent of pensioners were at the end of a decade than at the beginning.
The middle bar compares median incomes and the right-hand bar the
top ten per cent.  During the 1960s and 1970s, the pensioner income
distribution narrowed considerably.  Median and bottom-decile incomes
grew by three and a half per cent a year in the 1960s and two and three-
quarter per cent a year in the 1970s.  The richest pensioners at the end of
the 1960s were only ten per cent better off than their counterparts at the
beginning of the decade.  Although the differences in growth rates by
income level narrowed in the 1970s, they were entirely reversed during
the 1980s.  The real incomes of the richest pensioners grew by four and
a half per cent a year, the median by less than two and a half per cent a
year and the bottom decile by just one per cent a year.
Figure 6.5  The changing pensioner income distribution in the
United Kingdom, 1961-92
Johnson and Stears’ (1995) results are confirmed by more recent official
data.  The Department of Social Security (2000a) estimates that the top
quintile of pensioner couples had 80 per cent higher incomes in 1996-97
than their counterparts in 1979, an annual growth rate of three and a half
per cent.54   The bottom quintile grew by 34 per cent over the same
period, equivalent to a little under one and three-quarter per cent a year,
less than half the growth rate at the top of the income distribution.  This
differential, however, is rather smaller than Johnson and Stears’ results
for the period 1981-82 to 1991-92.
6.3  The changing distribution
of pensioner incomes
54 The results are fairly similar for single pensioners: the top quintile income in 1996-97
was 76 per cent higher than in 1979 while the bottom quintile was 28 per cent
higher.
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The reason for the broadening of the income distribution in the 1980s
and 1990s is the rapid growth of private pension and investment income.
While the richer majority enjoyed the fruits of this growth, a poorer
minority of pensioners is dependent on state benefits whose value has
increased little in real terms since 1980.
Australia shows a more complex time-series pattern in the distribution of
pensioner incomes than the United Kingdom.  Table 6.2 presents a basic
measure of income inequality: the Gini coefficient.  The higher the
coefficient, the more unequal the distribution of incomes.  The distribution
of pensioners’ incomes narrowed in the early 1980s, but by the end of
the decade, the degree of inequality was similar to its level at the beginning.
However, the distribution narrowed again in the 1990s.
Table 6.2  Gini coefficient for pensioner incomes in Australia,
1982 to 1995-96
1982 1986 1990 1995-96
0.31 0.23 0.32 0.29
Source: King, Harding and W alker (1999)
Table 6.3 looks at poverty shares in Australia.  In the early 1970s, almost
half of the poor were pensioners, but this had fallen to less than 30 per
cent by 1996.  Their place among the poor has been taken mainly by
low-income workers.
Table 6.3  Characteristics of the poor in Australia, 1972-73
and 1996
Per cent 1972-73 1996
O ld 46 29
W orking age
O ut of labour force 27 29
In labour force 27 42
Source: King (1998)
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This chapter extends the analysis by breaking down pensioners’ total
incomes into their different sources.  The most important single source
of income is, of course, public transfers, including both public pensions
and social-assistance benefits.55
Figure 7.1 shows the replacement rate of total income and the replacement
rate from public transfers in a series of OECD countries.  In France,
Germany and, especially, Sweden, the vast majority of the elderly’s income
comes from the state.  In other countries, however, there is a large gap.
In Italy, the elderly are more likely than in other OECD countries to live
with their children or other relatives (see Table 1.1).  In Australia, Japan,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, private
pension incomes are particularly important (see Table 7.1).
The important part played by governments in the development of private
pensions should be noted.  This is not simply confined to the passive role
of leaving ‘space’ for the development of private pensions by having a
limited public pension programme.  Perhaps most important is the role
of tax reliefs on pension contributions and pension fund investment
returns.  This has played an important part in the growth of occupational
and personal pensions in the United Kingdom and similar plans elsewhere.
In the United States, for example, these include individual retirement
accounts (IR As), Keogh plans and 401(k) plans.  Canada’s registered
retirement savings plans (R R SPs) have also seen rapid growth.56   But
there have been other significant contributions to the development of
private pensions in the United Kingdom.  These include the rules for
contracting out of SER PS and the regulation of occupational pension
funds.57   A series of measures since the 1970s vastly improved the
protection of the pension rights of ‘early leavers’.  These regulations have
played a central role in the rapid growth of occupational pension income
in the 1980s and 1990s.
INCOME SOURCES7
55 See Kohl (1992) in addition to the studies surveyed here.
56 See Whitehouse (1999) for a discussion of the taxation of private pensions.
57 See the discussion of these rules in Section 9.4 and in Disney and Whitehouse (1992a,b).
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Figure 7.1  Ratio of pensioners’ transfer and total incomes to
older workers’ incomes in nine countries, couples
Figure 7.2 extends the analysis to look at the role of transfer incomes at
particular points of the income distribution.  The top chart looks at the
poorest pensioners and the bottom chart, at the richest.  Unsurprisingly,
poorer pensioners everywhere rely on the state for the vast majority of
their income.  Some differences begin to emerge in the middle income
quintile, but they become much more apparent at the top of the income
distribution.  The comprehensive social-insurance schemes in France,
Germany and Italy mean that the richest pensioners still get the majority
of their income from the state.  Indeed, the proportion in France and
Italy is only slightly below the proportion for the bottom income quintile.
The other countries all have predominantly flat-rate public pension
systems, or earnings-related public schemes with highly progressive
formulae.  In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States,
only around a fifth of the income of the richest quintile of the elderly
derives from public pension programmes.
Table 7.1  Percentage of pensioners with income from
employer-provided pensions in eight countries, late 1990s
Per cent All Men Women
Australia 20 7
Canada 41 54 31
Germany 21 9
Japan 10
N etherlands 50 76 23
N ew Zealand 11
United Kingdom 49 66 32
United States 36 48 26
Source: Johnson (1998), Table 3.3; Johnson (1999), Table O P1
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These results are broadly confirmed by a second study of OECD countries
(Börsch-Supan, 1998), shown in Figure 7.3.  The differences between
the two are probably accounted for by the different samples (Figure 7.2
looks at younger pensioners) and in the choice of measurement unit.
Italian pensioners, for example, receive much less of their income from
the state, according to these data.  R icher pensioners in France and Italy
also appear to have much lower proportions of public benefit income at
the top of the income distribution than Johnson reports.  In addition, the
decline in the role of the state with income is much more pronounced in
the United Kingdom.
Figure 7.2  Percentage of pensioners’ income from public
pensions and other state benefits in nine countries, by quintile
of the income distribution
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Figure 7.3  Percentage of pensioners’ income from public
pensions and other state benefits in nine countries, by income
quintile
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Tables 7.2 and 7.3 analyse how the sources of pensioners’ incomes in the
United Kingdom have changed since the end of the 1970s.  The role of
the state has declined.  Back in 1979, over 60 per cent of the elderly’s
incomes came from the state.  This fell to a minimum of just 50 per cent
in 1992.  There has also been a shift in the structure of state support for
the elderly.  In 1979, the basic state pension, the flat-rate (near) universal
benefit, accounted for the vast majority of public transfers.  Payments
under the earnings-related public pension (SER PS) have only now begun
to grow, since the system was introduced in 1978.  There has also been
growth in the role of the main social-assistance benefit (now known as
Income Support or, for pensioners, Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG))
and in other transfers (principally means-tested payments to help with
housing costs and local taxes).
Table 7.2  Changing sources of pensioner incomes in the
United Kingdom, 1979 to 1996-97 (Family Expenditure Survey
data)
Per cent of
total income 1979 1989 1992 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Benefits 61 52 50 52 51 53
of which:
Basic state pension 52 40 37 37 36 38
SERPS 0 1 2 3 3 4
Income support 4 4 5 6 6 5
O thers 5 6 6 6 6 6
O ccupational pension 16 22 24 25 24 26
Investments 11 18 20 15 16 14
Earnings or other 12 8 7 8 9 7
Source: D epartment of Social Security (2000a,c,f)
N ote: the split of total benefit income is derived by adjusting using aggregate benefit spending on the
elderly.  Since the Family Expenditure Survey sample differs from the population of benefit recipients
(principally due to the exclusion of the institutional population), the split should be treated as illustrative
only.  See Appendix A.6 for a discussion of the data
The biggest growth has been in employer-provided pensions.  The spread
of occupational-pension membership among the workforce, which peaked
in the 1960s, is still feeding through to higher pension benefits.  Also, a
series of legislative and regulatory changes in the 1970s and 1980s have
improved the protection of occupational pension rights of people who
change jobs before retirement and in post-retirement indexation of
benefits.  Investment incomes also grew strongly over the period.
However, income levels respond strongly to changes in interest rates.
R ates were very high in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but have since
fallen to their lowest level since the 1960s.58   Finally, the role of earnings
continually diminished as labour-force participation of the elderly has
declined.
7.1  Changing sources of
incomes over time: the United
Kingdom
58 See, however, the discussion of measuring capital incomes in Section 9.1 below.
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Table 7.3  Changing sources of pensioner incomes in the
United Kingdom, 1994-95 to 1997-98 (Family Resources
Survey data)
Per cent of total income 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Benefits 53 55 53 52
of which:
Basic state pension 39 40 38 38
SERPS 2 5 5 5
Income support 6 4 4 4
Others 6 7 6 6
O ccupational pension 25 25 26 26
Investments 14 12 13 13
Earnings or other 8 7 8 8
Source: D epartment of Social Security (2000a,c,f)
N ote: see notes to Table 7.2
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Much of the debate on incomes of the elderly is based on the implicit or
explicit prior assumption that there is little if any movement in pensioners’
incomes, although the exception of widowhood is usually acknowledged.
Pensioners who are poor in one period are expected to remain poor in
the future.  In fact, the small number of studies that include analysis of
income and poverty dynamics among the elderly show a surprising degree
of mobility.59
There is, however, a very important general caveat that applies to studies
of income and poverty dynamics.  In cross-section studies, the process of
aggregation cancels out (or at least substantially mitigates) the problem of
measurement error.  In contrast, studies of dynamics rely on comparing
differences in incomes at two different points in time and both incomes
are measured with error.  This compounds the effect of measurement
error.  Nevertheless, the policy implications of the dynamics of pensioners’
incomes are profound.
There have been few studies of income and poverty dynamics in an
international context due to the scarcity of panel data (particularly long
panels) in most countries.  Antolín, Dang and Oxley’s (1999) study for
the OECD is one exception, but the data for the United Kingdom are
based on pre-tax incomes while net incomes are used for the other three
countries covered.60   This substantially overstates poverty rates in the
United Kingdom and so is not particularly useful for our purposes.
The Department of Social Security’s (2000d) income-distribution analysis
now includes data on income dynamics drawn from the British Household
Panel Survey.  These data show that 17 per cent of pensioner couples
were persistently poor, in that they spent four years in the bottom 30 per
cent of the overall income distribution.  This compares with 13 per cent
of the population as a whole.  Single pensioners were, however, much
more likely to be persistently poor, with 33 per cent remaining in the
bottom 30 per cent of the income distribution.  This suggests a reasonable
degree of income mobility among the elderly, especially among pensioner
couples.  Jarvis and Jenkins (1996) found that single and married pensioners
made up 19 and nine per cent respectively of the people who escaped
from a low income during a four-year period, close to their population
shares.
INCOME AND POVERTY DYNAMICS8
59 There is a number of studies of income and poverty dynamics of the elderly in the
United States, including Burkhauser, Holden and Feaster (1988) and Holden,
Burkhauser and Myers (1987).
60 See also the analysis of the European Community Household Panel in Mejer and
Linden (2000) and Duncan (1993) on eight countries.
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Other studies have looked directly at changes in pensioners’ incomes,
rather than indirectly through poverty measures.  Another dataset in the
United Kingdom - the R etirement Survey - covers the same group of
older people in 1988-89 and 1994.  Figure 8.1 shows that most people’s
incomes were close to unchanged between the two years, between plus
and minus 10 per cent.  However, a substantial group had large changes
in incomes between the two waves of the survey: some exceeding a 20
per cent increase, others falling by more than 20 per cent.61
Interestingly, income changes over time were equalising.  The incomes
of the richest 40 per cent of pensioners barely changed in real terms
between the two surveys.  In contrast, pensioners in the bottom income
quintile enjoyed an income increase of over 20 per cent and the second
and third income quintiles saw growth of over 10 per cent.62   Note that
these changes relate to the same pensioners over time, unlike the results
in the section on income trends.
Figure 8.1  Change in pensioner incomes by sex and marital
status in the United Kingdom, 1988-89 to 1994
Hurd (1990) observed that ‘the transition to widowhood itself seems to
induce poverty’.  Section 2.1 showed that single female pensioners, the
majority of whom are widows, have lower incomes than single men or
married couples.  However, a complete understanding of the effects of
widowhood on living standards can only be gleaned from direct
comparison of post-bereavement incomes with the combined income of
the couple before the spouse’s death.  This section looks at the evidence
from the United Kingdom R etirement Survey.63
8.1  Income dynamics
8.2  Widowhood
61 See Webb (1997) in addition to Johnson, Stears and Webb (1998).
62 Johnson, Stears and Webb (1998), Table 4.  Incomes excluding earnings of men aged
65-69 in 1988-89.
63 This section is based on Johnson, Stears and Webb (1998).  See also Burkhauser,
Butler and Holden (1991) on the United States.
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Women who were widowed between the 1988-89 and 1994 waves of
the R etirement Survey had an average real income of £ 127 a week,
compared with £ 175 a week for the couple before widowhood.  The
largest component in the income decline is in occupational pensions,
accounting for nearly a third of the fall.  Only one in five widows have
an occupational pension from their own contributions.  Although three
out of five inherited some pension from their deceased husband, the
value of the survivor’s pension is typically around 50 per cent of the
couple’s pension.64   There is a similar decline in receipt of state benefits.
While the value of the state pension is broadly the same, income from
other state benefits is much lower after widowhood (usually because of
the loss of the husband’s invalidity benefits).
What is the impact of the £ 50-a-week income fall on living standards?
After bereavement, the income only has to support one rather than two
people.  The ratio of the average income of the couple before widowhood
to the income of the widow after bereavement is 175/ 127 = 1.38.  The
method for comparing incomes of households of different sizes by
economists is the equivalence scale (see Appendix C for a detailed
discussion).  The equivalence scale in this case would show the income
level that would give the same standard of living to the single pensioner
as to the couple before widowhood.  The scales used in the various
studies in this paper range between 1.41 and 1.7 in the ratio of a couple’s
income to a single person’s.  Taking reciprocals of all these numbers, we
find that the widow has an income of £ 127/ £ 175 = 73 per cent of the
couple’s income.  The equivalence scales suggest that if she had an income
of between 59 and 71 per cent (i.e., 100/ 1.7 to 100/ 1.41), she would be
as well off as she was before bereavement.  The benefits system in the
United Kingdom assumes that a single person needs 60 per cent of the
income of a couple.  On all of these (implicit and explicit) equivalence
scales, therefore, the widow can, in this average case, afford a better
living standard than before the loss of the husband.
How can we reconcile these results with the single female pensioners’
relatively low incomes reported by cross-section studies?  The answer is
that widows tend to come from poorer families in the first place: an
effect of differential mortality by income.  Husbands who survived between
the two waves of the survey had an average occupational pension of £ 65
a week in 1988-89 and average investment income of £ 26 a week.  This
was much higher than the private incomes of husbands who died, which
averaged £ 49 and £ 12 a week respectively.  Total private incomes were
64 Studies have found a sizeable negative effect of widowhood on incomes in the United
States: see, for example, Hurd (1989), Hurd and Wise (1989a) and Burkhauser, Butler
and Holden (1991).  This has been attributed, in particular, to poor provision for
survivors’ benefits in private pensions.  In the United Kingdom, however, most
occupational pension schemes offer a reasonable level of survivors’ benefits, partly
because this is a requirement for contracting out of SER PS.
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therefore over 40 per cent higher for men who survived than men who
died.  In addition, 64 per cent of couples where both spouses survived
between the two waves owned their own homes, compared with just 46
per cent where the woman was widowed.65   This differential-mortality
effect means that cross-section comparisons of incomes by sex and marital
status should be interpreted with caution.
65 Disney, Johnson and Stears (1998).
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The papers surveyed have all followed a broadly similar approach to
defining income.  Nevertheless, this standard method has a number of
shortcomings: some are general, applying equally to national studies of
income distribution; others are specific to the international comparisons
of concern here.
The standard ‘statistical’ measure of income used in distributional analyses
is governed by data availability.66   This statistical measure typically differs
from a desirable ‘economic’ measure of income.  The basic economic
measure arises from the Haig-Simons67  definition: the change in net
economic wealth between two points in time plus consumption in that
period.  Put another way, this economic definition of income is how
much someone could spend in a particular period while leaving him- or
herself no worse off at the end of the period.68
However, this economic definition is difficult to put into practice because
it requires data on both consumption flows and wealth stocks.  Household
surveys often do not ask questions about wealth stocks, only about income
flows.  Even surveys that do ask about wealth typically do so only at a
single point in time.  The standard statistical measure of income - including
capital income earned during the relevant period - is an approximation
to the economic definition, but it differs in two important respects.
First, it ignores capital gains.  If capital gains are measured in surveys,
they are usually measured only on a realised basis.  Accrued (or unrealised)
capital gains are very difficult to measure.  Secondly, the statistical measure
does not take account of the effect of inflation.  The Haig-Simons
definition of income makes little sense if presented in nominal terms:
income should be the amount one can spend leaving the real value of
wealth intact, not the nominal value.  Yet, the standard measure typically
includes nominal capital income as income.
INCOME CONCEPTS9
9.1  Capital income
66 Although it could also be argued that it is a microeconomic version of the income
definition used in national-accounts studies.
67 Haig (1921) and Simons (1938).  Goode (1977) argues persuasively that von Schanz
anticipated the Haig-Simons definition in 1896 and so prefers ‘Schanz-Haig-Simons’.
68 This is similar to Hicks’ (1946) definition but Hicks implicitly excludes irregular
sources of income, such as capital gains.  By writing that income is ‘the maximum
amount of money which the individual can spend this week, and still expect to be
able to spend the same amount in real terms in each ensuing week’, he appears to
foreshadow Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis (see below).  The Haig-Simons
definition implicitly includes non-recurring sources of income.
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The effect of including nominal capital incomes in the standard measure
is to distort comparisons when inflation rates differ.  The Department of
Social Security’s Pensioners’ Incomes Series, for example, shows a decline
in pensioners’ investment incomes in the early 1990s.  During this period,
United Kingdom base rates fell from 15 per cent to less than half that
level.  This was a major factor behind the fall in investment incomes,
shown above in Table 7.2.  But inflation also fell over the period: from a
peak of nearly 11 per cent to less than three per cent, leaving real interest
rates fairly stable.  The fact that real interest rates were fairly stable implies
that the measured decline in the level of investment incomes overstates
the change in economic income according to the Haig-Simons criterion.
It is sensible to think of interest as consisting of two components: the
first, compensation for inflation and the second, the real return (if real
rates are positive).  People can safely spend the real component of their
interest earnings while leaving their wealth intact, as in the Haig-Simons
definition of income.  However, if they spent their nominal interest in
each period, the value of their wealth would fall, with the rate of decline
varying with the rate of inflation in each period.
Similar problems occur in international comparisons between countries
with different inflation rates.  Higher inflation countries would appear to
have relatively richer pensioners (since the elderly tend to have higher
stocks of wealth than the population as a whole).  Again, there is a potential
case of money illusion.  If pensioners in higher-inflation countries spent
their nominal interest, then their stock of wealth would decline more
rapidly.  The Haig-Simons definition of income can be thought of as a
measure of consumption possibilities without saving or dis-saving.
Including nominal interest in the income measure necessarily implies
some dis-saving at any positive inflation rate.69
A possible correction would be to include only real investment income.
However, the data requirements of such an adjustment would be onerous.
We would need to know the capital income from each source as well as
the value of the assets in each source to convert the nominal return into
a real return.
Nevertheless, the Haig-Simons approach, while economically robust,
may not be appropriate for a study of the incomes of the elderly.  It
assumes that the elderly’s command over resources is limited such that
they would still have their current wealth stock left when they die.  The
Haig-Simons definition of income underlies Friedman’s (1957) permanent
income hypothesis - that expenditure is determined by the ‘permanent’
level of income, not by transitory ups and downs - which explicitly
69 See Vanoli and OECD (1996b) on alternative measures of interest in national accounts
under inflationary conditions.
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assumes that people have infinite lives.  In this case, people would want
to leave their net wealth position intact.  R eturning to the real world,
where lives are finite, it seems reasonable to suggest that pensioners might
finance some of their spending from running down their wealth.  Indeed,
such behaviour is the standard prediction of the lifecycle model of
consumption.70   This process is automatic in pension schemes that provide
annuities: the payment stops when the beneficiary (or any survivor) dies.
Net wealth is obviously zero at that point.  This applies to all public
benefits and the majority of occupational and personal pension benefits.
Most other assets, however, are not in the form of annuities.
The corollary of holding wealth in non-annuitised forms is that people
will leave unintended bequests.  Because life expectancy is uncertain,
people will run down their assets slowly to ensure that they do not run
out of resources before they die.  However, it is difficult to disentangle
these unintended bequests from people’s express wishes.  Extensions of
the lifecycle consumption model have looked at altruistic and strategic
reasons for wanting to leave bequests.71   The desire to bequeath wealth
might suggest a return to the Haig-Simons definition of income as wealth
that has not been annuitised and that can be assumed (at least in large
part) to be saved for bequests.  However, this approach would be erroneous
for two reasons.  First, the stock of wealth represents command over
resources that a pensioner could spend if she or he so wanted.  Secondly,
if bequests are altruistic, then presumably elderly donors derive some
utility from the knowledge that their pet charity or relative will benefit
after they have passed on.  If bequests are strategic, then pensioners enjoy
some non-pecuniary return.72
This analysis therefore invites a definition of income that asks: how much
can people safely spend in a period and expect to have net wealth of zero
when they die?  The easiest way of maximising available resources per
period while ensuring final net wealth is zero is, of course, to buy an
annuity.  This gives a comprehensive measure of command over resources,
which is defined as the sum of non-capital income plus initial period
wealth times the annuity rate.  This approach has many of the advantages
of measures of living standards using expenditure (see Section 1.2).  In
particular, it is consistent with the lifecycle model of consumption.  The
annuitisation of wealth should not, however, be seen as a recommendation
of an appropriate financial strategy for the elderly.  R ather, it is a way of
70 Modigliani and Brumberg (1955) and Yaari (1965).
71 For example, Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985).
72 An alternative argument builds on a precautionary motive for the elderly to hold
stocks of wealth.  If insurance markets are imperfect, then pensioners may need to
self-insure against potential health-care and long-term care costs.  The result is that
many pensioners, who are fortunate enough to avoid the need for expensive care, will
leave bequests.  Again, however, it is difficult to argue that a pensioner with a large
stock of wealth held against such needs is only as well off as one with no savings.
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combining flows of incomes (state and private pensions) and stocks of
wealth into a single measure of command over resources.
The main implication of this approach is that the measure of command
over resources derived from wealth increases with age.  Figure 9.1 shows
the annuity rate calculated using standard actuarial techniques on the
latest population life table for the United Kingdom.  For an older worker
- say, age 50 - the annuity rate is around 4.5 per cent (averaging between
the sexes).  For a pensioner of 70, the annuity rate is double that: nine
per cent.  Assume for a moment that both age groups earn the same
investment return on their wealth.73   The standard measure would say
that the command over resources derived from this capital was equal.
This measure of command over resources would say that pensioners,
with a shorter life expectancy, could afford to run down their capital
more quickly, and so their command over resources is larger.
Figure 9.1  Annuity rates by age and sex
A second, related implication is that the value of the command over
resources deriving from stocks of wealth increases at all ages compared
with the standard statistical measure, which includes only income from
capital.  The chart assumes an interest rate of two per cent.74   The Haig-
Simons definition says that this return is what people can spend, leaving
capital intact, shown by the dotted line.  Taking account of the ability to
draw down capital as well as spend interest increases command over
resources even for the very youngest.
73 Prudent investors would probably shift their portfolio to less risky assets as they get
older: see, inter alia, Jagannathan and Kotcherlakota (1996), Samuelson (1989) and
King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982).  Thus, older investors would earn a lower rate of
return than younger investors.
74 Annuity rates are calculated using the riskless interest rate (e.g., that on long-term
government bonds) because they deliver a certain stream of payments.  Even if people’s
wealth is held in higher-risk, higher-return assets, it is reasonable to compare the
return on an annuity with the riskless interest that would be earned on the fund.
Note that the pattern of the result would be the same at different interest rates.
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The implications of this treatment of capital income are complex because
wealth holdings vary with characteristics that are important for the purposes
of our study, such as age and income.  Table 9.1 gives a tentative flavour
of its impact.  The first column shows mean net financial wealth in the
United Kingdom by age band.  The data exclude pension wealth (in
occupational schemes)75  and holdings of real assets, such as housing.
Financial wealth increases with age until it peaks for the age band 60-69.
The second column simply assumes that capital income is two per cent
of the value of wealth.  The third column shows the annuity value of
wealth calculated as described previously.
Table 9.1  Wealth, illustrative capital income and annuity
values by age band, United Kingdom
Age Mean wealth Capital income Annuity value
22-29 862 17 27
30-39 2 613 52 90
40-49 5 283 106 215
50-59 10 102 202 521
60-69 13 059 261 936
70 and over 8 473 169 927
Source: authors’ calculations based on N ational O pinion Polls’ Financial Research Survey 1997-98 as
reported in Banks and Tanner (1999), Table 5.5
The effect of using the annuity measure is twofold.  First, there is a
general increase in measured command over resources for all people who
hold wealth because we allow for the run-down of the capital as well as
the expenditure of the income.  Since wealth increases with age, the
effect is to increase the measured living standards of the elderly more
than those of younger people.  Secondly, there is the age-specific effect.
This again boosts pensioners’ command over resources more than it does
workers’ because of the decline in life expectancy with age.
We have not yet explored the detailed implications of such an approach
on the measured relative living standards of the elderly, which would
require analysis of a comprehensive dataset covering income and assets.
However, some rough calculations can give an indication of the potential
effect.  According to the Department of Social Security’s Pensioner’s
Incomes Series, investment incomes make up 14 per cent of pensioners’
incomes on average.  Assuming that this represents a five per cent return
on assets, then the annuity value of wealth would increase measured
75 Pension rights during the ‘accumulation’ phase - when the worker is building up
pension rights - are obviously an asset of worth to the occupational scheme member.
However, it does not seem sensible to include their annuitised value in current income
because scheme rules and tax legislation prevents the withdrawal of funds before
pension age.  (Also, it is not possible to borrow against occupational pension assets
formally, i.e., to use them as collateral.)
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command over resources of the elderly by five per cent.76
Table 9.2 explores the implications of using a comprehensive measure of
command over resources for a number of countries using the data on
financial assets from Disney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998).  Wealth
is shown as a ratio to income in the first four columns, split by marital
status and between pensioners and older workers.  Among the pensioner
units, the wealth-to-income ratio is the highest in Australia: single
pensioners have assets worth over six times their income, couples, five
times.  The average across all the countries shown is around 2.5 for both
single pensioners and couples, with Japan and the United States also
showing high levels of wealth relative to income.  The United Kingdom
ranks sixth.
The final two columns indicate the effect of including the annuity value
of wealth in income. 77   This is again based on an arbitrary five per cent
return on assets.  The increase from taking a more comprehensive view
of command over resources is thus 2.8 per cent: the annuity rate at age
67 (7.8 per cent) less the return on assets already counted as income (five
per cent).
The average difference would be a seven per cent increase in pensioners’
incomes, with significant variation between countries.  For example,
countries such as Australia and the United States tend to have relatively
low pension replacement rates.  However, a broader concept of command
over resources would put them closer to the position in other countries.
Indeed, Australia is an excellent illustration of the benefits of this approach.
Partly because of fiscal incentives and partly for historical and cultural
reasons, most occupational pensions in Australia are drawn as lump sums
rather than an annuity (known as an ‘income stream’ in Australia).78
The result is that Australia has one of the lowest pensioner replacement
rates on the standard measure of income, but has the highest holdings of
wealth.  Australian pensioners clearly must finance their consumption by
running down their assets: a form of self-provision of an annuity.  Compare
76 The investment income measure currently includes annuity incomes.  It would
obviously be sensible to include annuity income in regular income and calculate wealth
from all non-annuitised sources of capital income.  According to Department of Social
Security (2000b), annuity income bought from an occupational pension (presumably
either from the lump sum or from the accumulation in a defined contribution scheme)
is under £ 1 a week on average and mean income from personal pensions, £ 3.
Investment income excluding annuities is around 12.5 per cent of total income rather
than 14 per cent (before this adjustment).  The increase in pensioners’ command over
resources by using this broader measure would be 4.5 per cent.
77 Note also that these calculations account for the age distribution of pensioners in
deriving the mean annuity rate but do not adjust for differential holdings of assets by
age.  The annuity rates are based on the United Kingdom life table, but the difference
in mortality patterns between the different countries are not particularly large.
78 See Doyle and Piggott (2001) and Bateman and Piggott (2001).
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this with another country, the United Kingdom, say, where most
occupational-pension benefits are taken as an annuity.  Measured income
would be higher and asset holdings lower on standard measures even if
the economic position were the same.  The measure of comprehensive
command over resources equalises the treatment of these two different
systems of pension provision.
Table 9.2  Financial wealth as a proportion of income and
effect on income from annuitisation
Financial wealth to income ratio Increase in income
Age 55 Age 55 Age 67 Age 67 Age 67 Age 67
Single couple single couple single Couple
Australia 2.2 2.1 6.2 5 18% 14%
France 1.9 1.5 2.1 3.7 6% 10%
Germany 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.2 3% 3%
Italy 1.8 1.3 2.8 2.8 8% 8%
Japan 2.8 1.7 4.0 3.8 11% 11%
N etherlands 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.9 3% 3%
Sweden -0.1 -0.1 1.1 0.7 3% 2%
United Kingdom 0.9 0.7 1.4 1.3 4% 4%
United States 2 1.5 3.5 3.2 10% 9%
Source: D isney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998), Table 9
N ote: the data are from between 1992 and 1995, with the exceptions of the United Kingdom (1988-89)
and the N etherlands (1990)
This section has explored some important limitations of the treatment of
capital income and wealth in standard measures of living standards.  We
have argued for a more comprehensive view of command over resources,
which acknowledges the ability of the elderly (and indeed others) to
finance consumption from accumulated capital as well as from the income
earned on that capital.  This approach was developed in the North
American literature and has been proposed by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (1995).79   However, we are only aware of one recent
implementation: Crystal and Shea (1990).  Their results suggest that
adjusting for under-reporting of investment income would increase the
mean replacement rate for the elderly in the United States from 94 to
103 per cent.  Allowing for the annuity value of wealth then increases
the measured replacement rate from 103 to 124 per cent.
The Canberra group of international experts on income distribution
statistics considered this approach.  Everaers, van der Laan and McDonald
(2000), for example, argued that ‘Economic well-being is determined by
a household’s access to goods and services…[and] is also affected by saving
for future consumption and by the value of wealth holdings that offers
opportunities for increased consumption in the future by running down
79 Examples of this approach in North America include Murray (1964), Weisbrod and
Hansen (1968), Moon (1977) and Danziger et al. (1984a,b).
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assets.  Income presents a partial view of economic well-being…’  The
authors discuss the Australian Bureau of Statistics (1995) proposal and
note that there are methodological issues that need to be resolved before
such an approach might be implemented.  These are the type of annuity
(for example, covering an individual life or both partners in a married
couple) and the interest rate that is assumed.
The previous section looked in detail at the treatment of financial wealth.
Many pensioners, however, have a far more valuable asset in the shape of
their own home.  Indeed, for many older households, housing wealth is
the major asset other than social-security or private-pension wealth.  Two
recent studies in the United Kingdom estimate the median equity value
of home-owning pensioners at just over £ 70,000 in the late 1990s.80
Similarly, the Council of Mortgage Lenders has estimated that
homeowners aged 60 and over had £ 367 billion in unmortgaged equity
in 1986, averaging around £ 72,500 per dwelling.81   However, home
ownership rates decline with age (although this is partly a cohort rather
than a pure age effect) and increase with income.  This makes housing
wealth a particularly important component of assets for younger, richer,
pensioners.82   Thus, fluctuations in house prices can have very large
implications for the wealth of such households.83   Housing also affects
living standards through the cost of maintenance and repairs.
If this is an important issue in the United Kingdom, what of other
countries?  Table 9.3 provides some details on the extent of home
ownership across a number of countries.84
9.2  Housing
80 Hancock (1998a,b) - based on Family Expenditure Survey data - and Disney, Johnson
and Stears (1998) - using R etirement Survey data.
81 See Forrest and Leather (1997) and Council of Mortgage Lenders (1998).
82 According to Disney, Johnson and Stears (1998), 64 per cent of respondents to the
R etirement Survey who survived from 1988-89 to 1994 were owner occupiers at the
end of the period.  The ownership rate was much lower among those who died
between those years.  Hancock (1998b) shows that the owner occupation rate varies
from 24 per cent in the lowest income quintile of 65-74 year olds, through to 95 per
cent in the top quintile (in the early 1990s).  Among heads of households aged 75 or
over, owner occupation rates are slightly lower, especially in the third quintile.
83 Disney, Henley and Stears (2000).
84 See Whitten and Kailis (1999) for an analysis of housing tenure of the elderly in EU
member states.
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Table 9.3  Pensioners’ housing tenure by income quintile in eight countries
Bottom quintile Middle quintile Top quintile
Rent Mortgage Own Rent Mortgage Own Rent Mortgage Own
Australia 20 2 78 21 4 75 13 6 81
Canada 42 9 50 23 10 66 21 8 71
France 34 3 62 38 5 57 21 7 72
Germany 63 5 32 64 7 29 37 21 42
Italy 35 4 62 36 3 61 34 3 63
N etherlands 57 11 33 81 7 12 47 26 26
United Kingdom 46 4 50 47 5 48 10 15 75
United States 30 70 15 85 10 90
N ote: ‘own’ means owned outright except in the United States where it is not possible to separate people who own their home outright from people with a
mortgage
Source: Johnson (1998); authors’ tabulations of British Household Panel Survey
Owner-occupation rates are extremely high in Australia and the United
States and comparable with the United Kingdom in Canada.  Elsewhere
in Europe, owner-occupation rates are significantly lower, especially in
the Netherlands.  In addition, many home-owners still have a mortgage
on their property in Germany and the Netherlands.  To the extent that
housing wealth represents an additional implicit annuity stream, pensioners
in the Anglo-Saxon countries are better off than income-based calculations
would imply.  As Table 9.4 shows, housing tenure has changed significantly
over time in the United Kingdom.  The treatment of housing will also
therefore have an effect on time series comparisons.
Table 9.4  Pensioners’ housing tenure in the United Kingdom,
1961-62 to 1991-92
per cent 1961-62 1971-72 1981-82 1991-92
O wner occupier 44 43 57 60
Social rented 22 44 42 32
Private rented 34 34 11  8
Source: Johnson et al. (1996), Table 3.6
Owner occupation yields a flow of services that should, in principle, be
treated as an income flow, usually called an ‘imputed rent’.  The ‘asset-
rich, income-poor’ phenomenon seems particularly pertinent with housing
wealth, especially in countries such as Australia where the tax (and means-
test) treatment of retirement-income streams invites individuals to hold
their assets in the form of housing.85   Nevertheless, there are difficulties
in simply interpreting home ownership in this manner: housing is both
an investment and a consumption good.  The phenomenon of asset-rich,
income-poor households has also led to concerns as to the affordability
of home ownership for pensioners.  This applies especially to widowed
or single pensioners who continue to live in houses with substantial
85 See Creedy and Disney (1989, 1990) for an analysis of these incentives.
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maintenance burdens that are hard to afford from current income and
financial wealth.86   But pensioners are often reluctant to move from their
family home87  so that housing wealth proves a constraint on current
living standards rather than simply a source of additional imputed income.
There are a number of different issues here that need to be disentangled.
The first is to determine what is the annuity value of this housing wealth,
and how its use would affect the incomes of pensioners and the poverty
rates among pensioner households.  Hancock (1998b) provides an
illuminating account of this in the United Kingdom.  However, converting
housing equity into an annuity implies the existence of a competitive
and secure equity-release sector.88   But this market has remained rather
thin in the United Kingdom arising, it may be suspected, from loading
charges in part associated with the adverse-selection problems intrinsic
to such a market.
The second strategy, therefore, for releasing equity is through ‘downsizing’
of accommodation, either by moving to a smaller owned house, or even
into the rented sector.  What is the extent of this phenomenon, how
much equity is typically released, and for what is it used?  We consider
the evidence briefly.
Hancock (1998b) uses the Family Expenditure Survey to calculate the
annuity streams that could be generated from the housing wealth of
pensioner households.  She then examines what fraction of pensioner
households would gain from such a strategy - that is, where the net
annuity stream generated is above a certain threshold (£ 130 a year) -
how these gains would affect measured incomes and, in particular, poverty
rates among pensioner households.  Her calculations suggest that the
proportion of pensioners (home-owning pensioners) that would gain
rises with age: from 18 per cent (28 per cent) of single men aged 65 or
over, to 28 per cent (45 per cent) of single men aged 70 or over and to 44
per cent  (75 per cent) of single men aged 75 or over.  This is because the
annuity rate increases with age (Figure 9.1) while the amount deducted
to pay the interest on the underlying mortgage is constant.  Single women
who are homeowners gain disproportionately, and couples also gain
because of their high incomes.  Table 9.5 illustrates her results.  It shows
the proportion of each group that would gain by income quintile and
their average gain.  R icher pensioners obviously would benefit more,
both because they are more likely to be home-owners and because they
tend to live in more valuable homes.
86 See Feinstein and McFadden (1989) and Disney, Gallagher and Henley (1994).
87 Venti and Wise (1990); Megbolugbe, Sa-Aadu and Shilling (1999).
88 Equity-release policies are often called ‘home-income plans’ in the United Kingdom.
In addition to Hancock’s work (1998a,b), see Jacobs (1996).  Case and Schnare (1994),
Mayers and Simons (1994) and Merrill et al. (1994) discusses equity-release schemes
in the United States, where they are often called ‘reverse mortgages’.
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Table 9.5  Gains from equity release among people aged 65+,
by income
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Top
quintile quintile quintile quintile quintile Total
% of all 65+  who gain 8 19 22 26 32 21
% of all 65+  homeowners
who gain 39 47 33 30 33 36
% of all 70+  homeowners
who gain - 63 52 50 58 56
median annual gain for all
65+  who gain - £910 £810 £860 £1010 £900
N ote: median gains in 1997-98 prices
Source: Hancock (1998b), Table 4
Poverty rates among the elderly are also affected by equity release.  If the
poverty rate is defined relative to mean equivalent net income, then the
effect on measured poverty is more dramatic the higher is the relative
poverty line.  For all pensioner households, there is little discernible
effect until the poverty line rises to 65 per cent of the mean, when inclusion
of equity wealth would reduce measured poverty by four percentage
points (from 38 per cent to 34 per cent).  This is obviously because the
poorest pensioners are much less likely to be home-owners and, if they
are, their homes tend to be less valuable.  For households headed by
someone aged 75 or over, there is an eight percentage point fall.  Among
home-owners, and especially the most elderly home-owners, the gains
are largest; in the latter case for 75+ aged owners, reducing the measured
poverty rate (with a 65 per cent of mean income threshold) from 24 per
cent to 8 per cent of owner-occupied households.89
The problem with all this is differential mortality, and therefore selection
by insurers and self-selection by applicants.  A basic reason why the equity
release market is so thin is that applicants for schemes will tend to be
longer lived, or are assumed to be so by insurers.  Thus, pricing of equity-
release schemes will contain loading by insurers reflecting adverse selection,
as well as administrative costs.  Actual financial gains from equity release
are likely to be much lower, with a consequent reduced impact on
measured income and poverty rates.  Plausible empirical evidence of the
impact on pensioner incomes of the operation of equity-release schemes
in practice is limited precisely by the thinness of the market.
The most effective form of equity release practised by older households
is through downsizing and through changes in tenure status.  Here there
89 The Joseph R owntree Foundation (1998) has looked at equity release as a way of
financing home maintenance and improvement for asset-rich, income-poor elderly.
The Foundation found that the policy of using equity release to replace improvement
grants failed because elderly homeowners were very reluctant to take on debt and
because of legal obstacles to housing associations and local authorities giving equity-
secured loans.
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is some evidence on housing equity released through house moves by
elderly households, and on the relation of house moves to housing wealth
and income.  A number of studies have examined the relationship between
house moves and ‘excess’ housing costs, measured in either physical units
- for example, number of rooms per family member - or monetary terms
- for example, income-to-housing-wealth ratios.90   The presumption is
that moves are more likely where the house is ‘inappropriate’ to the size
of the family or when there are changes in economic status (such as
retirement).
The results of these studies are mixed.  Ermisch and Jenkins (1999) find
some evidence that retired households who move do physically reduce
their living space.  Moreover, evidence from the United States is that
some households move to rented accommodation after retirement as a
way of releasing housing equity for consumption.  But in the United
Kingdom, more older households switched from rental to owner
occupation than made the reverse move in the late 1980s, perhaps because
of ‘right-to-buy’ policies in housing maintained by local authorities.  There
is some evidence that death of a spouse is particularly associated with a
house move91  and that retirement or the spouse leaving job (but not
own retirement) is associated with moving in the United Kingdom.92
However, Disney, Henley and Stears (2000) find no evidence that ‘excess’
housing budget shares, relative to income, were associated with household
moves in the late 1980s.  This was perhaps because this was a period of
falling house prices that induced elderly households to ‘sit tight’.  However,
this paper does estimate that moving by elderly households was associated
with an increase in financial assets, indicating some evidence of ‘equity
release’ as a motive for moving.
Given the difficulty in finding clear cut relationships between moving
behaviour and observable variables such as the household’s financial
characteristics, it is not surprising that it is hard to pin down relationships
between housing equity, financial wealth and household spending.  A
basic issue is whether changes in the value of housing equity induce
households to increase their consumption.  R eal house prices have
generally tended to grow and pensioners typically own their home
outright.  Thus, choosing an income measure of well-being - if imputed
rents from owner-occupation were ignored - would tend to understate
the growth in (potential) real living standards during periods of house
price increases.93
90 Feinstein and McFadden (1989) on the United States; Ermisch and Jenkins (1999)
and Disney, Henley and Stears (2000) on the United Kingdom,
91 Megbolugbe, Sa-Aadu and Shilling (1999) on the United States; Ermisch and Jenkins
(1999) on the United Kingdom.
92 Ermisch and Jenkins (1999); Disney, Henley and Stears (2000).
93 Venti and Wise (1989, 1991).
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An interesting finding is that of Engelhardt (1996), who argues that there
is an asymmetry in household behaviour between periods of rising and
falling house prices.  His evidence across states in the United States suggests
that, where house prices are rising, there is little change in consumption
or saving behaviour of households.  By inference, such households do
not treat rising housing equity as enhancing their consumption possibilities.
This could be either because they intend to bequeath their housing wealth
or because they do not perceive housing wealth gains symmetrically with
other wealth gains (for example, windfalls in financial assets or current
income).  However, when there are house price falls, these are associated
with significant increases in saving in financial assets, perhaps because
households are attempting to maintain a minimum level of overall wealth.
Disney, Henley and Stears (2000) add a nuance to this argument.  The
period covered by the two waves of the R etirement Survey (1988 to
1994) in the United Kingdom saw a significant fall in real house prices,
although the decline was very uneven across the country.  Thus, the
authors can test the impact of house price falls on saving (acquisition of
financial assets) for a large sample of elderly households.  They argue
that, since moving is the major way of releasing equity, the impact of the
fall in house prices on financial asset acquisition will be different between
movers and non-movers.94   They indeed find that movers almost
completely offset the fall in housing wealth by an increase in financial
assets, suggesting that the release of housing equity may have been used
to restore target wealth.  However, most people did not move, and for
these households, there is no significant change in saving behaviour: these
households simply took the ‘hit’ to their wealth stocks arising from the
house price fall.
Cross-country comparisons of the value of housing equity (Smeeding et
al., 1993; Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995) suffer from two main problems.
First, they combine the value of direct subsidies to social rented housing
with the value of home-owners’ equity.  Although both of these relate
to housing, they are very different economic issues, as the section below
on in-kind incomes will show.  Secondly, the data are for from ideal.  In
most cases, the value of housing equity has to be imputed from a different
dataset and matched into the Luxembourg Income Study by age and
income.  People are then simply assumed to earn a fixed rate of return on
the value of housing equity.  For these reasons, we have not reported
these results.
In summary, housing wealth is an important determinant of the standard
of living for many older households: its use, for example, could reduce
significantly measured poverty among very elderly households outside
the poorest quintile.  Nevertheless, the equity-release market is quite
94 Although the two decisions, to move and to save, should be and are modelled
simultaneously.
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thin in the United Kingdom and in other OECD countries.  The evidence
that pensioner households use house moves to release equity is strong,
but many elderly households are reluctant to move at all, even when
they have high potential values of housing equity.  Large houses (relative
to income) are both a blessing and a curse, from the point of view of
pensioner well-being.95
The standard measure of income takes account of direct taxes (income
tax, property taxes etc.), but ignores other taxes that might affect people’s
living standards. The most significant omissions are indirect taxes - which
in turn include both general consumption taxes (value-added tax) and
excise duties - and employer social security contributions.
A problem arises because countries differ enormously in their tax structures
(Table 9.6).  Denmark, Australia and New Zealand, for example, collect
a particularly large proportion of their revenues from the personal income
tax, but do not levy social security contributions on employers or (except
for a small charge in Denmark), on employees.  In contrast, France,
Germany and the Netherlands rely heavily on social security contributions,
in the first two cases, mainly paid by employers.  Finally, the United
States is the only OECD country without a general consumption tax: its
state-level sales taxes raise fewer revenues than value-added tax or goods-
and-services tax in other countries.  (Japan and Switzerland also record
small receipts from general consumption taxes because their levies were
introduced only recently at a low rate.)
Table 9.6  Structure of taxation in OECD countries (per cent
of total revenues from each source)
General
Personal income Corporate income Social security consumption
D enmark 52 Luxembourg 16 France 45 Iceland 32
Australia 41 Japan 15 Germany 39 Turkey 24
N ew Zealand 45 Australia 13 N etherlands 38 N ew Zealand 23
Average 29 Average 7 Average 26 Average 17
Portugal 20 Germany 4 D enmark 3 Switzerland 8
France 14 Austria 4 Australia 0 United States 8
Greece 9 Iceland 3 N ew Zealand 0 Japan 5
N ote: the table shows the ‘outliers’ in each case, i.e., the O ECD  countries with the three highest and three
lowest proportions of total revenues from each source
Source: W hitehouse (1997)
Excluding general consumption taxes from our measure of income would,
under certain circumstances, have no effect.  First, if in each country the
tax were truly general (i.e., applied to all goods and services equally),
then the tax burden would be the same for all groups.  Thus, replacement
rates, poverty rates etc. would be unaffected.  However, all countries
9.3  Taxation
95 See, for example, the survey of older homeowners’ attitudes in Askham et al. (1999)
and the analysis in Hancock et al. (1999).
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exempt some goods and services and most tax others at zero or lower
rates.  Still, if consumption baskets were the same for different groups,
then the tax burden would again be the same.  But pensioners and people
of working age have very different spending patterns, both between goods
and services with full versus concessionary general consumption tax rates
and across goods subject to excise duties (alcohol, tobacco, petrol etc.).
The effect of indirect taxes on pensioners and workers in the United
Kingdom is illustrated in Figure 9.2.  The chart shows the amount paid
in indirect taxes as a proportion of income across the income range.  The
population has been divided into ‘retired’ and ‘non-retired’ households
and into deciles of the income distribution in each of these two groups.
The burden is overall higher on non-retired households than it is on
retired: the means across the deciles are 23.5 and 21.5 per cent respectively.
The poorest 80 per cent of retired households generally face a smaller
indirect-tax burden than the non-retired.
Since consumption decisions are obviously affected by the level of indirect
taxes on different goods and services, these estimates of the indirect tax
burden are only a reflection of the actual welfare effect of the tax.  People
will tend to substitute goods with a lower tax rate for more heavily taxed
goods.
Figure 9.2  Indirect tax burden by income decile for retired
and non-retired households, United Kingdom, 1997-98
For both groups, indirect taxes appear to be regressive: the burden is
generally higher for lower income deciles.  This is explained by the savings
rate at different income levels.  Poorer groups tend to dis-save, so their
consumption exceeds their income and hence the apparent indirect-tax
burden, measured against income, is relatively high.  R icher groups tend
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to save, with the reverse effect: income exceeds consumption and so a
smaller part of income is taxed.  This is apparent in the chart both in the
decline in the indirect-tax burden with income for both groups, but also
in the cross-over of the retired and non-retired households’ lines at high
income levels.  High-income working-age households tend to have high
savings rates, while the elderly save rather less of their incomes.
The result that indirect taxes are regressive measured against income is,
however, very misleading.  Savings are not just another kind of good or
service, they are a means to future consumption.  When savings are
eventually spent, either by their owners or their heirs, they will bear
indirect taxes.
Again, however, adjusting for this effect is complicated.  One method is
to compare indirect taxes paid against consumption rather than income
for different groups.  This shows that the indirect-tax burden is progressive
rather than regressive because zero-and low-rated goods and services (food,
domestic fuel etc.) make up a larger proportion of the consumption baskets
of poorer groups.96
The effects of indirect taxes on the measures of the elderly’s relative
living standards are complex.  Ignoring the problem of savings, the data
imply that the pensioner replacement rate is increased by two percentage
points by accounting for indirect taxes.  The increase would be rather
larger if we adjusted for the future indirect taxes paid when savings are
spent.  Secondly, since poorer pensioners bear a lower indirect-tax burden
than poorer workers, there will be a reduction in both pensioner poverty
rates and pensioner poverty shares.  Unfortunately, the data for many
other countries would not allow us to calculate the impact of indirect
taxes.  In contrast, the United Kingdom’s Family Expenditure Survey is
ideal for this purpose, because it includes detailed data on both income
and consumption.97
Employer social security contributions are not a problem for our purposes
- examining the relative living standards of the elderly - although they
have an important effect in studies of tax incidence and redistribution.98
The international guidelines on income distribution statistics include
employers’ social security contributions in the market income of the
employee.  However, these contributions are then deducted to reach the
concepts of disposable income used here.  The net result is unaffected.
96 A simple adjustment would be to apply the indirect-tax burden measured against
consumption to the whole of income.  This makes the rather strong assumption that
future consumption will have the same pattern (across goods and services taxed at
different rates) as current spending.
97 The OECD secretariat’s efforts (Adema, 1999; Adema et al., 1996) to adjust social
expenditure data for differences in indirect-tax regimes suffer from this problem and
the authors are forced to rely on aggregate data, which is of little use for our purposes
here.
98 See, for example, R osenberg (1989) and R osenberg and Bell (1992).
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The issue of workers’ contributions to private pension plans is more
complex.  Contributions to public pension programmes are deducted
from the gross incomes of working-age individuals while private pension
contributions are treated as any other kind of savings: that is, as part of
current income that could be spent.  However, the dividing line between
public and private pension programmes is often blurred.99   We use some
international examples to illustrate the issues.
Switzerland requires all workers and their employers to make a minimum
contribution to a private pension plan.  This is clearly little different from
a mandatory contribution to a public scheme.  A consistent treatment
would be to deduct compulsory private pension contributions from
workers’ incomes in the same way as contributions to public plans are
deducted.  Since the contribution is mandatory and there is no way that
it could be spent, then it should not be treated as part of current income.
The United Kingdom system is more complex.  Around three-quarters
of employees are contracted out of the State Earnings-R elated Pension
Scheme, SER PS, into either defined benefit or defined contribution
occupational schemes or into personal pension plans.100   Defined benefit
schemes must then offer to pay a minimum benefit while defined
contribution plans must receive a minimum contribution.  In a personal
pension, the employee continues to pay the standard rate of National
Insurance and shortly after the end of the fiscal year, the government
then transfers the compulsory minimum contribution to the individual’s
personal pension provider.  Thus, personal pension contributions are
treated in the same way as a contribution to SER PS.  In contrast, in a
defined contribution occupational pension, employers and employees
pay a reduced rate of National Insurance but must pay the difference into
the occupational plan.  This is the parallel of the Swiss case.  The
employee’s net income is over-estimated: although the National Insurance
contribution is lower, this money is not available for current consumption.
A consistent treatment - with both personal pension contributions and
SER PS - would be to exclude these contributions from current income.
The defined benefit case is more complicated.  Again, employers and
employees pay a reduced rate of social security contributions when the
scheme is contracted out.  The scheme is then obliged to pay a minimum
level of benefit, which is financed by employer and (usually) employee
contributions.  Until the Pensions Act 1995, the minimum benefit was
the ‘guaranteed minimum pension’, which was broadly equal to (but
normally a little less than101 ) the SER PS benefit foregone as a result of
9.4  Private pension
contributions
99 The OECD - Adema and Einerhand (1998) - has documented the growing role of
private social benefits, particularly in the area of pensions.
100 See Disney and Whitehouse (1992a,b) and Whitehouse (1998) for a detailed discussion
of contracting out.
101 See Dilnot et al. (1994) for an explanation.
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contracting out.  The government set the contracted out rebate on the
advice of the Government Actuary at a level that would, under reasonable
assumptions, finance the guaranteed minimum pension.  Under this
system, consistency would require the contracted out rebate to be treated
as a compulsory contribution to a private pension.
It is more difficult to determine a suitable approach under the new
contracting out regime.  The benefits test for contracting out is no longer
linked to the level of the contracted out rebate.  For most workers, the
minimum benefit from an occupational pension scheme will be more
than the contracted out rebate would finance.  Simply deducting the
value of the rebate of employee contributions from workers’ incomes
would understate the degree of mandatory pension provision.  It would
be possible to calculate the contribution required to pay for the minimum
benefit using standard actuarial techniques.  The result, however, would
be sensitive to a range of assumptions.  In addition, many schemes pay
more than the minimum benefit, so it would be difficult to allocate the
cost between employer and employee contributions.  Perhaps the safest
approach, therefore, would be to deduct the contracted out rebate from
workers’ incomes accepting that this is an under-estimate of the total
cost (and may be an under-estimate of the cost to the employee) of
meeting the mandatory benefit requirement.
Japan also has a system of contracting out of its public earnings-related
scheme.  About a fifth of employees are members of an Employees’
Pension Fund.  These plans can contract out if they pay a benefit at least
30 per cent larger than that which would have been received from the
state scheme.  In return, social security contributions are rebated at a rate
that varies between 3.2 and 3.8 per cent (depending on the soundness of
the scheme’s finances), averaging 3.5 per cent.
In the United Kingdom, employers have been unable to force employees
to join their occupational pension schemes since 1988.  However, in
other countries with a large defined benefit occupational sector - such as
Canada and the United States - employers can make membership of the
pension plan a compulsory part of the employment contract.  The United
Nations guidelines on income-distribution statistics recommend that the
employee contributions to occupational plans be deducted from incomes
where the employer mandates membership.  The rationale is similar to
that for pension contributions mandated by the government: the
contribution is not available for the worker to spend currently and so
should not form part of net income.
Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden provide the final example.  The
government does not generally require employees to contribute to private
pensions, but workers covered by collective agreements have to contribute
to occupational schemes.  Since these cover around 80 to 90 per cent of
employees, these programmes are best described as quasi-mandatory.
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Again, contributions should be deducted from incomes to ensure
consistency with countries with mandatory, public pension programmes.
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from exploring this issue
empirically.  However, coverage of mandatory or quasi-mandatory private
pensions in Denmark, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom is broad.  In some cases, it appears
that these contributions are already deducted from workers’ incomes.  In
others, the average net incomes of the working age population would be
reduced if contributions to these plans were treated consistently with
public schemes.  A rough back-of-the-envelope calculation for the United
Kingdom, for example, would be a reduction in workers’ net incomes of
between two and four per cent.  This would increase pensioner income
replacement rates by between one and three percentage points.  Such a
change would be sufficient to move the United Kingdom up the rankings
of replacement rates by up to three positions (depending on the study).
The standard measure of income is generally based on cash income and
what is often termed ‘near-cash’ income.  Examples of the latter include
food stamps in the United States and housing benefit - paid directly to
the landlord - in the United Kingdom.  However, the line between what
counts as ‘near-cash’ income and other free or subsidised goods and services
is a fine one.  And the implications for measures of living standards can
be profound.
We take housing as an illustration since the issues are familiar to analysts
of income distribution in the United Kingdom.  During the 1980s, the
United Kingdom government reduced direct subsidies to social housing,
so-called ‘bricks-and-mortar’ subsidies.  The burden of financing housing
for low-income groups then shifted to the housing-benefit budget.  Since
the value of subsidised housing is excluded from the standard measure of
income but housing benefit is included, a family living in social housing
would record a rise in income even if its circumstances were unchanged.
The effect on income distribution was shown to be large.  Official statistics
in the United Kingdom get round the problem by showing incomes
before and after housing costs.102   Nevertheless, a parallel problem occurs
in cross-country comparisons because of differences in housing policy.
Housing benefit counts as income in the United Kingdom but the value
of subsidised housing in, say, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries,
does not.
Two other public programmes involve significant government
expenditure.  Health and education are often the largest budgets after
cash transfers (social security).  The benefits of these two programmes are
also distributed unevenly - both by age group and by income range -
suggesting a large potential impact on measures of income distribution.
9.5  In-kind incomes
102 See Johnson and Webb (1992).
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Since the scope of such programmes also varies between countries, there
might also be an impact on cross-country measures.  The measures of
cash incomes shown above essentially take account of the cost of public
services (by deducting taxes from gross incomes) but not the benefit the
public enjoys.
Figure 9.3 illustrates how health care expenditure on the elderly is generally
higher than health care expenditure on the rest of the population.  It also
shows that this ratio varies substantially across countries.  Insofar as health
care expenditures are publicly provided, ignoring in-kind benefits will
bias downwards the relative incomes of the elderly, and may also change
the ranking of countries.
There have been three international studies of the impact of benefits in
kind on the income distribution, although all are closely related and all
build on Luxembourg Income Study data.103   There are many uncertainties
in these estimates.  They also invoke many strong assumptions.  These
include the absence of externalities (so all the benefits accrue to the direct
recipient) and that all the value of the benefit to the recipient is equal to
the cost of providing the benefit incurred by the government.104
Figure 9.3  Ratio of health care expenditure on population
aged 65+ to expenditure on people aged 0-64, 11 OECD
countries, 1993
103 Gardiner et al. (1995) and  R adner (1997) are two other international studies.
See also Evandrou et al. (1992, 1993) and Harris (1999) on the United Kingdom.
104 Wolfe and Moffitt (1991) and United States Bureau of the Census (1982, 1995)
attempt to calculate a measure of the value of the benefit to households rather
than looking at the cost of providing it.
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Table 9.7 shows the value of health and education spending as a percentage
of cash income.  The size of the figures is striking: these in-kind benefits
cost as much as a quarter of the value of cash incomes to provide.  The
cost of benefits for the elderly is generally higher than the population as
a whole, with the exception of Germany, where the total figures are
about the same.  On average, benefits for the elderly cost 25 per cent of
cash income compared with 18 per cent for the population as a whole.
The structure of benefits, however, differs.  The elderly are rarely
beneficiaries of education spending, which makes up nearly half of the
total cost of these services for the population as a whole.
Table 9.7  Public spending on health and education as a
percentage of household cash income
Population Elderly
Health Education Total Health Total
United Kingdom 8.9 8.7 17.6 20.8 21.3
Germany 10.2 4.1 14.3 13.9 14.1
N etherlands 13.2 9.7 22.9 32.1 32.2
Sweden 13.4 11.8 25.2 43.7 43.7
Australia 9.0 7.3 16.3 20.4 21.1
Canada 8.7 10.9 19.6 26.9 27.9
United States 7.0 9.3 16.3 15.0 16.1
Source: W hiteford and Kennedy (1995), Tables 5.1 and 5.2
Including in-kind benefits is therefore likely to affect the value of the
standard measures of the relative living standards of the elderly.  We
begin with the replacement rate (Table 9.8).  As would be expected from
Table 9.7 above, the result is typically a small increase in replacement
rates once benefits-in-kind are taken into account.  The main exception
is Sweden, where the very large expenditures on healthcare for the elderly
result in a sizeable increase in the measured replacement rate.  Although
the pattern of results is broadly similar - because the estimates are based
on similar data and methodology - the level of the replacement rate
varies significantly because of large differences in the measure of cash
income.
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Table 9.8  Replacement rates of the elderly for cash incomes and for cash incomes plus the
cost of providing education and health
Smeeding et al. W hiteford and Steckmest
Kennedy
Single Couple All Single Couple
before after before after before after before after before after
Australia 37 39 66 68 73 76
Canada 42 47 80 84 88 96
Germany 50 48 87 86 98 97
N etherlands 56 56 82 84 102 110
N orway 76 78 90 90
Sweden 56 69 100 111 84 97 78 83 95 97
United Kingdom 31 33 58 57 84 87 80 82 83 84
United States 41 43 87 86 97 97 43 42
Source: Smeeding et al. (1993), Table 3; W hiteford and Kennedy (1995), Tables 5.1 and 5.2; Steckmest (1996), Table 4.2
The effect of measuring in-kind benefits on poverty rates is more complex
because the benefits of publicly provided services can be distributed
differently across different income groups.  Table 9.9 shows the results
from two studies, where poverty is defined as an income below half the
average.  Including benefits in kind reduces measured poverty rates in
every case.  Indeed, in some countries this virtually eliminates measured
pensioner poverty.  Again, poverty rates for cash incomes differ
substantially between the two studies (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).
There are few re-rankings after in-kind benefits are taken into account.
The only exception is the United Kingdom, where measured poverty
rates improve relative to other countries once the benefits of health and
education spending are included.
Table 9.9  Elderly poverty rates based on cash incomes and cash incomes plus the cost of
providing education and health
Smeeding et al. W hiteford and Kennedy
Single Couple Single Couples All
before after before after before after before after before after
Australia 46.1 8.2 7.7 4.9 8.2 1.7 2.0 0.5 4.9 1.1
Canada 41.8 9.4 8.9 1.3 39.4 8.2 23.6 5.0 30.0 6.8
Germany 18.1 14.6 8.8 4.4 11.5 6.5 10.2 3.7 10.9 5.1
N etherlands 4.9 4.9 1.4 1.0 3.5 1.6 2.7 1.3 3.0 1.5
Sweden 1.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 14.8 6.8 8.6 3.1 11.3 4.6
United Kingdom 50.3 18.6 23.5 1.1 6.8 2.9 9.2 2.6 8.1 2.7
United States 45.2 33.9 17 8.9 34 22 17.4 11.3 25.3 16.4
Source: Smeeding et al. (1993); W hiteford and Kennedy (1995), Table 5.5
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This report has surveyed the results of a dozen recent papers on the
relative living standards of the elderly in the United Kingdom and in 18
comparable OECD countries.105   Cross-national analysis of income
distributions is a relatively recent research topic.  Over half of the papers
examined focus on the income distribution as a whole, with the position
of the elderly emerging only as a by-product of the study of economy-
wide patterns of inequality.
It is very easy to draw simplistic policy conclusions from any analysis
based on cross-section data.  It is also easy to get lost in the detailed
methodological questions that we have covered.
The cross-country comparisons that we have presented suggest that
pensioners in the United Kingdom do about as well on average - relative
to society as whole - as their counterparts do in comparable OECD
countries (in Europe, North America and Australasia).  In the latest study
for the OECD secretariat, for example, pensioner incomes adjusted for
household size are 78 per cent of the incomes of the whole population.
This is a little below the average for all 15 countries (83 per cent).  The
proportion of British pensioners in poverty - defined here as having an
income below half the average - is 12 per cent, just below the international
average of 14 per cent.  Detailed comparisons show that the distribution
of incomes among pensioners in the United Kingdom is relatively
compressed, even when compared with continental European economies
that have rather narrow income and earnings distributions overall.
However, the results of different studies can give very different answers,
sometimes even when they are based on the same dataset.  Some of the
variation can be explained by methodology, by the time period and by
the countries covered.  There is a definite trend for the position of British
pensioners to look better in more recent studies.  This is also confirmed
by national data sources - particularly the Department of Social Security’s
Pensioners’ Incomes Series - which show rapid growth in pensioners’
incomes over the last two decades.  It is important to bear in mind that
even these most recent data are unfortunately only from 1995: recent
policy changes, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, will not therefore
be reflected in the results.
One of the principal reasons for this improvement over time is the
maturing of the pension system.  New retirees have much larger
CONCLUSIONS10
105 Note that we have excluded the ‘new’ members of the OECD, which have rather
lower GDP per head, such as the Czech R epublic, Hungary, Mexico, and Poland.
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occupational pension and SER PS entitlements than older pensioners do.
This is because improved protection of occupational pension rights of
early leavers and the introduction of SER PS in 1978 are only now fully
feeding through to retirement benefits.
Existing studies have painted a conflicting picture of pensioner incomes
across countries.  It is probably impossible to give a definitive answer to
the question posed at the beginning of the report: ‘how do British
pensioners fare relative to their counterparts overseas?’  Nonetheless, our
analysis has pointed to a number of gaps in our knowledge and ways in
which this work could usefully be developed.
First, there are potential studies that would complement the distributional
analyses surveyed here.  For example, simulation of future pension rights
for different illustrative individuals would control for the different levels
of maturity in the pension system and give some indication of the benefits
that today’s workers are likely to enjoy.  Given the long lead times involved
in pension policy between enactment and outcome, it is important to
know what rights today’s workers are building up as well as the rights
that today’s pensioners earned.  The United Kingdom’s recent reforms,
for example, have increased state pension rights for many lower-income
workers through the substitution of the state second pension for SER PS.
Other countries, in contrast, have cut pension entitlements to curtail the
growing pension burden arising from the ageing of the population.
Secondly, exploiting new datasets that are becoming available.  The
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) offers data collected
on a comparable basis for a range of EU countries.  Although the income
data in the ECHP surveys are limited, this dataset would complement
existing cross-national studies.  These have followed two approaches.
The Luxembourg Income Study aims to transform national datasets onto
a comparable basis.  Other papers (such as Johnson and the more recent
OECD studies) have issued detailed terms of reference to national experts.
This latter approach has the advantages that the researchers are familiar
with the data and with institutional details, such as the workings of the
tax and benefit system.  The ECHP is designed to be comparable across
countries from the start, avoiding many of the problems of the
Luxembourg Income Study database.
Furthermore, there has been little effort thus far to exploit the panel
aspect of the ECHP dataset, which would allow one to look at actual
replacement rates as people move from work to retirement.  The OECD
secretariat has also collected a series of national panel datasets - including
data from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands the United Kingdom and
the United States.  It might be possible to use this source along with the
European panel to examine the change in incomes over the transition
into retirement.
10.1  Future developments
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Thirdly, recent work has taken a broader view of the resources available
in retirement.  Disney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998), for example,
look at the financial and real assets owned by the elderly.  This report has
described a broader measure of command over resources.  It would be
useful to implement this measure for a range of countries to show the
effect of financial assets on the living standards of the elderly.  There are,
however, important methodological questions that need to be investigated
first, but these are not intractable.  The related issues of measuring housing
equity and how housing wealth can be incorporated into an economic
income measure are also worthy of further study.
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This study compares the income and wealth of recently retired (those
where the head is aged circa 65-69) with people immediately before
pension age (household heads aged circa 55-59).  It was prepared by the
OECD based on a draft by Disney, which drew on analyses of national
data sources by a series of experts.  Table A.1 shows the datasets used,
Table A.2 lists the contributors.
The datasets include all households in the specified age range except
Germany, Japan and Sweden, which exclude people living with their
descendants.  In France and the United Kingdom, the first survey is used
for income information, the second for data on assets.  The two named
surveys in the United States are used for the different age ranges.
Börsch-Supan’s (1998) study is based on a provisional version of the
same dataset.
Table A.1  Datasets used in Disney, Mira d’Ercole and
Scherer, 1998
APPENDIX A
A.1 Disney, Mira d’Ercole and
Scherer (1998)
DATA APPENDIX
Survey Years Sample Age groups
Australia Household Expenditure Survey 1993-94 1 094 55-59
65-69
France Budget de Famille 1994-95 1 412 55-57
Actif Financiers 1992 1 587 65-69
Germany Income and Expenditure Survey 1993 5 185 53-57
65-67
Italy Survey of Household Income and W ealth 1995 3 632 50-60
62-72
Japan N ational Survey of Family Income and Expenditure 1994 3 975 53-57
65-69
N etherlands Socio-Economic Panel 1990 993 51-59
65-73
Sweden Income D istribution Survey 1995 2 119 52-57
66-69
United Kingdom Family Expenditure Survey 1988-89 2 471 55-59
Retirement Survey 1988-89 1 383 65-69
United States Health and Retirement Survey 1992 2 206 51-61
Asset and Health D ynamics of the O ldest O ld 1993 2 153 70-79
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Table A.2  List of contributors to Disney, Mira d’Ercole and
Scherer, 1998
Contributor Institution
Australia Hans Baekgaard N ational Centre for Social and
Economic Modelling (N ATSEM),
University of  Canberra
France François Guillaumat-Taillet Institut N ational de la Statistique
et des Etudes Economiques (IN SEE)
Germany Axel Börsch-Supan, University of Mannheim
Annette Reil-Held
Italy Rosaria Marino Bank of Italy
Japan N oriyuki Takayama Hitotsubashi University
N etherlands Rob Alessie Tilburg University
Sweden Kjell Jansson Statistics Sweden
United Kingdom Richard D isney University of N ottingham/Axia
Economics
United States Jim Smith Rand O rganization
These papers draw on a series of papers prepared by national experts and
presented at a conference at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, London in
March 1998.  More detailed results will be published in Disney and
Johnson (forthcoming).  Table A.3 lists the national contributors.  Table
A.4 shows the data sources used.
Table A.3  List of contributors to Johnson (1998, 1999)
Contributor Institution
Australia Anthony King N ational Centre for Social and
Hans Baekgaard Economic Modelling, University of
Ann Harding Canberra
Canada Bev D ahlby University of Alberta
Michael Hoffman
France Louis-Paul Pele Institut N ational de la Statistique et des
N adine Legendre Etudes Economiques (IN SEE)
Germany Axel Börsch-Supan University of Mannheim
Annette Reil-Held
Reinhold Schnabel
Italy Agar Brugiavini University of  Venice
Elsa Fornero University of  Turin
Japan N oriyuki Takayama Hitotsubashi University
N etherlands Klaas de Vos Tilburg University
Arie Kapteyn
N ew Zealand Susan StJohn University of Auckland
United Kingdom Carl Emmerson Institute for Fiscal Studies
Paul Johnson
United States Alain Jousten Massachusetts Institute of Technology
A.2  Johnson (1998, 1999)
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Table A.4  Datasets used in Johnson (1998, 1999)
Survey Year(s)
Australia Survey of Income and Housing Costs 1995-96
Canada Survey of Consumer Finances 1995
France Family Budget Survey 1995
Germany Income and Expenditure Survey 1993
Italy Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and W ealth 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995
N etherlands Housing D emand Survey 1993-94
N ew Zealand Household Economic Survey Census 1997 1996
United Kingdom Family Resources Survey 1995-96
United States Current Population Survey 1997
N ote: the four survey years for Italy were merged into a single cross-section
This is another OECD study, but looks at general income-distribution
issues rather than specifically at the position of the elderly.  Again, it
draws on national experts using national data sources.  Table A.5 lists the
data sources, Table A.6 the contributors.  We have made limited use of
this study - only using it to compare results between studies as a test of
robustness - because it excludes the United Kingdom.  The original
study looked at a series of years from the mid-1970s, but we have only
used the most recent year of data.
Table A.5  Datasets used in Burniaux et al., 1998
Survey Year Sample
Australia Household Expenditure Survey 1993-94 9 700
Belgium Ministry of Finance data from tax files 1995 25 000
Canada Survey of Consumer Finances 1994 45 000
D enmark Law Model database 1994 1 in 30
Finland Income D istribution Survey 1995 12 800
France Revenus Fiscaux 1990 33 000
Germany Socio-Economic Panel 1994 4 600
Italy Survey of Household Income and W ealth 1993 8 100
Japan N ational Survey of Family Income and Expenditure 1994 60 000
N etherlands Income Panel Survey 1994 75 300
N orway Income D istribution Survey 1995 10 000
Sweden Income D istribution Survey 1994 13 000
United States Current Population Survey 1994 50 000
N ote: The sample sizes given are the number of households except in Belgium, where the sample size is
the number of individuals
A.3  Burniaux et al. (1998)
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Table A.6  List of contributors to Burniaux et al., 1998
Contributor Institution
Australia Peter Saunders Centre for Policy Studies
Robert Urquhart
Belgium Ive Marx Ministry of Finance
Christian Valenduc
Canada Michael Hatfield Human Resources D evelopment Canada
Iain Tyrell
D enmark Lars Pantmann Ministry of Finance
Finland Esko Mustonen VATT
Heikki Viitamäki
France Bernard Legris Institut N ational de la Statistique et des
Etudes Economiques (IN SEE)
Germany Markus Grabka D eutsches Institut für
W irtschaftsforschung (D IW )
Italy Marco di Marco Istituto Studi Programmazione Economica
(ISPE)
Japan Fumihira Mishikazi Economic Planning Agency
N etherlands Peter Heijmans Central Bureau of Statistics/Statistics
Hans de Kleijn N etherlands
N orway Jon Epland Statistics N orway
Sweden Yvla Andersson Ministry of Finance
Thomas Peterson
United States John Coder Luxembourg Income Study
Tim Smeeding
Hauser’s (1998) paper was commissioned by the International Social
Security Association and was presented at a joint OECD-ILO workshop
in Paris in December 1997.  The data were drawn from the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS), with the exceptions of Greece and Portugal.  The
data for these countries were gathered as part of the ASEG project
(Alterssicherung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft) at the University of
Frankfurt.  They are discussed in Ahrens (1996) and Nitis (1996)
respectively.  Table A.7 shows the years of data used in Hauser’s study.
Smeeding (2001), for example, describes the LIS database.
Bradshaw and Chen (1996) is also based on this wave of the LIS database.
Table A.8 shows the underlying national data sources.  Atkinson,
R ainwater and Smeeding (1995) and Whiteford and Kennedy (1995)
used earlier waves of the LIS.  The years of data used are reported in
Table A.9.
A.4  Luxembourg Income
Study
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Table A.7  Luxembourg Income Study and ASEG data used
in Hauser, 1998
Year of survey
Belgium 1992
Canada 1991
D enmark 1992
France 1989
Germany (W est) 1989
Greece 1987-88
Ireland 1987
Italy 1989
Luxembourg 1985
N etherlands 1991
Portugal 1989-90
Spain 1990
United Kingdom 1991
United States 1991
Table A.8  Luxembourg Income Study data sources used in
Hauser, 1998 and Bradshaw and Chen, 1996
Survey Year Sample
Australia Survey of Income and Housing Costs 1990 16 300
Belgium Living Conditions of Households 1992 3 800
Canada Survey of Consumer Finances 1991 21 600
D enmark Income D istribution Survey 1992 12 900
Finland Income D istribution Survey 1991 11 700
Germany Socio-Economic Panel 1989 4 700
Italy Bank of Italy Income Survey 1991 8 200
N etherlands Socio-Economic Panel 1991 4 400
N orway Income and Property D istribution Survey 1991 8 100
Spain Expenditure and Income Survey 1992 16 000
Sweden Income D istribution Survey 1992 12 500
UK Family Expenditure Survey 1991 7 100
US Current Population Survey 1991 16 100
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Table A.9  Luxembourg Income Study data used in Atkinson,
Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995 and Whiteford and Kennedy,
1995
Atkinson W hiteford
Australia 1985-86 1985-86
Austria 1987
Belgium 1988 1985
Canada 1987 1987
Finland 1990
France 1984 1984
Germany 1984 1984
Ireland 1987
Italy 1986 1986
Luxembourg 1985 1985
N etherlands 1987 1987
N ew Zealand 1987-88
N orway 1986
Sweden 1987 1987
Switzerland 1982
UK 1986 1986
US 1986 1986
N ote:  Finland, the N etherlands and N ew Zealand were not formally part of the Luxembourg Income
Study database, but national experts provided information to Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding using the
same methodology
This study for the OECD was again based on reports from national experts
following detailed terms of reference.  Table A.10 reports the underlying
national data sources.
A.5  Förster and Pellizzari
(2000)
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A.6  Department of Social
Security (2000a)
Table A.10  Datasets underlying Förster and Pellizzari (2000)
Survey Years
Australia Household Expenditure Survey 1976, 1984, 1994
Austria Microcensus 1983, 1995
Belgium Tax records 1983, 1995
Canada Survey of Consumer Finances 1975, 1985, 1995
D enmark Law model data base 1983, 1994
Finland Income D istribution Survey 1976, 1986, 1995
France Family Budget Survey 1984, 1989, 1994
Germany Socio-Economic Panel 1984, 1989, 1994
Greece Household Budget Survey 1974, 1988, 1994
Hungary Socio-Economic Household Panel 1991/92, 1997/98
Ireland Survey of Income D istribution and Living in Ireland Survey 1987, 1994
Italy Survey of Household Income and W ealth 1984, 1991, 1993
Japan Comprehensive Survey of Living Condition of the People
on Health and W elfare 1985, 1995
Mexico Survey of Household Income and Expenditure 1977, 1989, 1994
N etherlands Income Survey and Income Panel Survey 1977, 1985, 1990, 1994
(based on tax records)
N orway Income D istribution Survey 1986, 1995
Sweden Income D istribution Survey (based on tax records) 1975, 1983, 1990, 1994
Switzerland Survey on Living Standards, Income and W ealth 1992
United Kingdom Family Expenditure Survey 1975, 1985, 1991, 1995/96
United States Current Population Survey 1974, 1984, 1995
The United Kingdom’s official Pensioners’ Incomes Series relies on two
household surveys.  The Family Expenditure Survey (FES) is used for
1979 to 1996-97, while more recent studies are based on the Family
R esources Survey (FR S), which has been undertaken since 1994-95.
The main advantage of the new FR S is the larger sample size, with around
four times as many pensioner income units as the FES.  The FR S,
however, excludes households in Northern Ireland, which are included
in the FES sample.  FR S surveyors collect more data directly from
documentation (pay-slips, benefit books etc.).  This should mean that the
income data are more reliable than the FES.  Finally, the procedure for
re-weighting households to reflect differential non-response is more finely
tuned in the case of the FR S.  In particular, the FES sample is adjusted to
reflect lower response rates from richer households, but this adjustment
does not also take account of age differences in non-response.  In terms
of the results, the most important difference between the two surveys
relevant to the analysis of incomes of the elderly is that FR S records
significantly lower levels of investment incomes for single pensioners
than the FES.
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Figure B.1  Poverty rates at different poverty thresholds in 16
countries
Table B.1  Comparison matrix for poverty rates: proportion
of pensioners with incomes below 40 per cent of average
Smeeding W hiteford
Hauser Correlation: 0.99 (0.09) Correlation: 0.64 (0.06)
Means: 6,6 Means: 5,5
O bservations: 3 O bservations: 9
UK: 9,n/a UK: 9,1
Smeeding Correlation: 0.93 (0.07)
Means: 7,7
O bservations: 4
UK: n/a,1
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Table B.2  Comparison matrix for poverty rates: proportion
of pensioners with incomes below 60 per cent of average
Smeeding W hiteford
Hauser Correlation: 0.88 (0.32) Correlation: 0.64 (0.00)
Means: 21,24 Means: 22,22
O bservations: 3 O bservations: 9
UK: 40,n/a UK: 40,27
Smeeding Correlation: 0.99 (0.00)
Means: 31,34
O bservations: 4
UK: n/a, 27
Table B.3 reports the rank correlation coefficient for poverty rates and
their significance levels.106  Studies that are significantly different at the
ten per cent level are indicated by grey shading of the relevant cell.  The
last line of each cell gives the number of countries where the two relevant
studies overlap.
The studies numbered 1-10 are analyses of the Luxembourg Income
Study while the remainder are the studies surveyed in this report.107  The
first seven of these, based on the first wave of data, give reassuringly
similar results.  These consistently rank the United Kingdom at the bottom
or near to the bottom of the distribution.  Later studies paint a more
conflicting picture.  Correlations between results are typically poor, and
the United Kingdom’s position varies from nearly the top to the bottom
of the range.
106 Formally, these are Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients, t
a
.  These are more accurate
for small samples than the traditional Spearman coefficient.
107 They are respectively Smeeding et al. (1985), Smeeding, Torrey and R ein (1987),
Smeeding (1988), OECD (1988), Palme (1989), R ainwater (1990), Hedström and
R ingen (1990), Smeeding et al. (1992), Kohl (1990), Smeeding (1992) and R ainwater
(1992).
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Table B.3  Comparison matrix for rankings of poverty rates in 18 studies
8 UK rank 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 5/7 0.87 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.90 1.00 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.60 0.00 0.20 0.33 -0.67 0.33 0.60
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.30) (0.81) (0.37) (0.45) (0.13) (1.00) (0.71) (0.73) (0.31) (0.22) (0.22)
6 6 6 6 7 7 3 5 7 6 6 4 6 4 4 5 5
2 8/8 1.00 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.73 0.67 -0.07 0.14 0.24 0.62 0.00 0.24 0.67 -0.20 0.00 0.20
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.31) (1.00) (0.71) (0.55) (0.07) (1.00) (0.55) (0.31) (0.81) (1.00) (0.71)
7 8 8 8 6 4 6 8 7 7 4 7 4 5 4 6
3 8/8 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.73 1.00 0.14 0.21 0.36 0.64 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.33
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.30) (0.76) (0.54) (0.27) (0.04) (0.71) (1.00) (0.09) (0.71) (1.00) (0.37)
7 8 8 6 3 3 8 8 8 6 8 5 6 4 7
4 7/8 0.96 0.50 0.87 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.23 0.43 -0.20 0.05 0.33 -0.20 -0.33 0.20
(0.00) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09) (0.71) (1.00) 0.55 0.23 0.81 1.00 0.73 0.81 0.73 0.71
8 8 6 4 6 8 7 7 5 7 4 5 4 6
5 8/9 0.56 0.87 0.83 0.33 0.17 0.32 0.46 0.00 -0.11 0.60 0.20 -0.33 0.33
(0.05) (0.02) (0.15) (0.37) (0.60) 0.32 0.13 1.00 0.80 0.22 0.71 0.73 0.37
9 6 4 7 9 8 8 6 8 5 6 4 7
6 12/12 0.62 0.67 0.39 0.41 0.53 0.61 0.25 0.22 0.52 0.39 0.33 0.53
(0.07) (0.31) (0.21) (0.07) 0.04 0.03 0.45 0.42 0.13 0.21 0.73 0.06
7 4 8 12 10 9 8 10 7 8 4 9
7 5/6 1.00 0.40 0.24 0.20 0.73 0.00 0.07 0.67 -1.00 1.00 0.40
(0.30) (0.46) (0.55) 0.71 0.06 1.00 1.00 0.31 0.09 0.30 0.46
3 5 7 6 6 4 6 4 4 3 5
8 4/4 -0.33 -0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 — — — — 0.33
(1.00) (0.73) 1.00 0.30 1.00 1.00
3 4 3   3 3 3
9 2/8 0.79 0.79 0.14 0.07 -0.43 0.20 0.19 0.33 0.64
(0.01) 0.01 0.76 1.00 0.17 0.71 0.65 0.73 0.04
8 8 7 6 8 6 7 4 8
10 2/13 0.85 0.60 0.39 -0.11 0.14 0.18 0.67 0.87
0.00 0.17 0.28 0.72 0.71 0.62 0.31 0.01
11 9 8 10 8 8 4 10
11 3/14 0.09 0.33 -0.14 0.18 0.11 0.40 0.89
0.76 0.25 0.54 0.53 0.80 0.46 0.00
11 9 13 10 8 5 11
12 14/14 0.06 -0.06 0.49 0.05 0.800 0.22
0.92 0.84 0.06 1.00 0.09 0.47
9 12 10 7 5 9
13 15/1 0.31 0.07 0.00 0.40 0.33
0.24 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.37
10 6 6 5 7
14 13/14 -0.04 -0.11 0.60 -0.16
0.94 0.80 0.22 0.59
11 8 5 10
15 6/8 0.00 1.00 0.31
1.00 0.30 0.29
7 3 9
16 — -0.67 0.25
0.31 0.45
4 8
17 4/11 0.67
0.31
4
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APPENDIX C
Equation (1) shows a general, simple equivalence scale.  Equivalent income
(YE) is the ratio of the household’s gross income divided by the number
of people in the household (n) raised to the power of the ‘equivalence
elasticity’, e:
(1)
The main issue in the choice of the equivalence elasticity is the degree of
economies of scale that people benefit from when they live together.  Is
the maxim that ‘two can live as cheaply as one’ true?  Some elements of
households’ consumption have the characteristics of public goods as
described in the economics literature.
An equivalence elasticity of one implies that there are no economies of
scale.  Equivalent income is income divided by the number of people in
the household.  A household of two people would need to have twice as
much income as a person living alone to have the same standard of living
on this measure.
At the other extreme, an equivalence elasticity of zero means that
‘equivalent’ income is simply the household’s gross income.  An extra
household member has no effect on the household’s standard of living,
implying that they require no extra resources.
Burniaux et al. (1998), Förster and Pellizzari (2000), Smeeding and
Saunders (1998) and Antolín, Dang and Oxley (1999) use an equivalence
elasticity of 0.5.  Thus, equivalent income is gross income divided by the
square root of household size.
Figures C.1 and C.2 use a simple example to show the impact of the
choice of equivalence scale on measures of the relative living standards of
elderly and working age households.  We assume that elderly households
have an average of 1½ people and working age households 3½.  Figure
C.1 shows equivalent income for a working age household with a gross
income of 100 and an elderly household with a gross income of two-
thirds of that level.  The bottom scale shows the assumed equivalent
elasticity between the two extreme values of zero and one.  At zero, of
course, the equivalent income is simply the gross income of the household.
As the elasticity increases, the equivalent income of the working age
household declines more rapidly.  With an equivalence elasticity of unity
- implying no household level economies of scale - the worker’s equivalent
income is 28.5 (100 divided by 3½) and the pensioner’s is 44.5 (662/ 3
divided by 1½).
EQUIVALENCE SCALES
Y   =
Y
nε
E
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Figure C.1  Equivalent incomes of workers and pensioners
by equivalence elasticity
Figure C.2 shows the implications of the choice of equivalence elasticity
for a measure of the ‘replacement-rate’: the ratio of the pensioner’s income
to the worker’s income.  Now the effect is more pronounced.  The
replacement rate increases from two-thirds when gross incomes are
compared (the equivalence elasticity is zero) to 155 per cent with an
equivalence elasticity of unity.  Even between elasticities of 0.25 and
0.75, the replacement rate of equivalent income varies between 82 and
125 per cent.
Figure C.2  Replacement rate by equivalence elasticity:
ratio of equivalent income of pensioner household to
equivalent income of working-age household
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Other studies use equivalence scales that differentiate between children
and adults.  The reasoning is that additional children ‘cost’ less than an
extra adult in a household would.  Johnson (1998, 1999) and Hauser
(1998) use the OECD (1982) equivalence scales.  The ‘old’ scale is:
(2)
where n
a
 is the number of adults after the first and n
c
 the number of
children in the household.  The ‘new’ scale uses weights of 0.5 for
additional adults and 0.3 for children.  The treatment of children might
seem tangential to a study of incomes and poverty in old age.  However,
measures of pensioners’ incomes only make sense when measured against
working age households or the population as a whole, especially in
international comparisons of countries with differing income levels.
Figure C.3 compares the three scales used in practice (new and old OECD
and the scale with equivalence elasticity of 0.5) with the two benchmark
cases (household gross income unequivalised and per-capita income).  The
figure uses five sample family types, with household size again increasing
as we move to the right.  The vertical axis shows the adjustment applied
by that scale.  For example, the income of a couple with two children is
adjusted by multiplying by the following coefficients:
• 0.5 under the equivalence-elasticity approach (1/ √4).
• 0.37 under the old OECD scale (1/ 2.7 i.e., the reciprocal of 1 plus 0.7
for the second adult and 0.5 for each of the two children).
• 0.48 under the new OECD scale (1/ 2.1 i.e., the reciprocal of 1 plus 0.5
for the second adult and 0.3 for each of the two children).
The effects on measured equivalent incomes are very large: the new
OECD scale would rate a two adult, two child family as over 28 per cent
richer than the old OECD scale.  The equivalence elasticity approach
gives a slightly higher result still: 35 per cent above the old OECD scale.
These differences will be significant if the elderly live in households of a
systematically different size and age structure from the rest of the
population.
Y Y
1 + 0.7n 0.5n
E
a c
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Figure C.3  Adjustments to gross incomes under different
equivalent scales by family type
Figure C.4 shows the effect of the choice of equivalence scale on the
measurement of ‘replacement rates’: the ratio of pensioner incomes to
non-pensioner incomes.  For each of the six countries, the left-hand set
of bars shows the result using the old OECD scale while the right-hand
bars are based on the new scale.  Single pensioners’ relative incomes
decline in each case because adjusted incomes for all non-single-person
households are increased.  In Australia and Canada, replacement rates fall
by an average of seven percentage points, while in the other four countries
they are over 10 points lower.  In Australia, Canada and the United
States, pensioner couples’ replacement rates are higher under the new
scales.  In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, they are lower, but
only by a small amount.  The data for Germany stand out.  First, because
pensioner replacement rates in all three demographic groups fall by much
more with the change in equivalence scale than in other countries (by
between 14 and 19 percentage points).  Secondly, because married couples
exhibit a relatively large decline compared with other countries, larger
than the fall in measured income for single women.
The effect on countries’ relative replacement rates, given the similarity
of the pattern in the changes, is not large.  The only significant difference
in ranking between the two scales is for married couples in Germany,
with the highest replacement rate when measured on the old OECD
scale and the second lowest on the new OECD scale.
115
Figure C.4  The impact of two alternative equivalence
scales: pensioner incomes as a percentage of non-pensioner
incomes in six countries by sex, marital status and
equivalence scale
Hauser (1998) also compares pensioner incomes relative to workers’
incomes using the old and new OECD equivalence scales.  His results
show a much more uniform pattern across countries.  Among 65-74
year olds, the average replacement rate is 7½ per cent lower.
This varies across countries between six and nine per cent, with no
effect on the relative position of different countries’ replacement rates.
The effect of changing the equivalence scale is slightly greater among
the over 75s.  The average replacement rate is 10 per cent lower when
measured under the new scale rather than the old, ranging between
eight and 12 per cent.  However, there are only three, limited re-
rankings of countries’ replacement rates when the new equivalence
scale is substituted for the old.
There are many different approaches to choosing an equivalence scale.
Most scales in practice, however, are implicitly or explicitly a matter of
judgement.  Many national studies use the scale implicit in the structure
of social-security benefits comparing, for example, the minimum safety-
net income for a single person with the minimum for a married couple.
Typical results are an equivalence elasticity of between 0.5 and 0.6.
International studies, as noted above, have used elasticities between 0.5
and 0.77 (the old OECD scale).
A less subjective method is to compare households’ consumption
patterns.  But the enormous literature on this issue has produced little
consensus.  Although most results imply an equivalence elasticity
between 0.4 and 0.5, there are many examples both above and below
this range.
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This analysis has shown that the choice of equivalence scale can have
important effects on the living standards of the elderly relative to the
population and on the incomes of pensioners relative to pensioners of
different sex or marital status.108
108 Förster (1994) shows that aggregate poverty rates tend to be higher the lower
equivalence elasticity.  But in most countries, poverty rates also tend to rise as the
equivalence elasticity approaches unity (i.e., the measure is income per head).  Poverty
rates plotted against the equivalence elasticity are therefore U-shaped.
131
OTHER RESEARCH REPORTS AVAILABLE:
No. Title ISBN Price
1. Thirty Families: Their living standards 0 11 761683 4 £ 6.65
in unemployment
2. Disability, Household Income & 0 11 761755 5 £ 5.65
Expenditure
3. Housing Benefit R eviews 0 11 761821 7 £ 16.50
4. Social Security & Community Care: 0 11 761820 9 £ 9.70
The case of the Invalid Care Allowance
5. The Attendance Allowance Medical 0 11 761819 5 £ 5.50
Examination: Monitoring consumer
views
6. Lone Parent Families in the UK 0 11 761868 3 £ 15.00
7. Incomes In and Out of Work 0 11 761910 8 £ 17.20
8. Working the Social Fund 0 11 761952 3 £ 9.00
9. Evaluating the Social Fund 0 11 761953 1 £ 22.00
10. Benefits Agency National Customer 0 11 761956 6 £ 16.00
Survey 1991
11. Customer Perceptions of R esettlement 0 11 761976 6 £ 13.75
Units
12. Survey of Admissions to London 0 11 761977 9 £ 8.00
R esettlement Units
13. R esearching the Disability Working 0 11 761834 9 £ 7.25
Allowance Self Assessment Form
14. Child Support Unit National Client 0 11 762060 2 £ 15.00
Survey 1992
15. Preparing for Council Tax Benefit 0 11 762061 0 £ 5.65
16. Contributions Agency Customer 0 11 762064 5 £ 18.00
Satisfaction Survey 1992
17. Employers’ Choice of Pension 0 11 762073 4 £ 5.00
Schemes: R eport of a qualitative study
18. GPs and IVB: A qualitative study of the 0 11 762077 7 £ 12.00
role of GPs in the award of
Invalidity Benefit
19. Invalidity Benefit: A survey of 0 11 762087 4 £ 10.75
recipients
132
20. Invalidity Benefit: A longitudinal 0 11 762088 2 £ 19.95
survey of new recipients
21. Support for Children: A comparison of 0 11 762089 0 £ 22.95
arrangements in fifteen countries
22. Pension Choices: A survey on personal 0 11 762091 2 £ 18.95
pensions in comparison with other
pension options
23. Crossing National Frontiers 0 11 762131 5 £ 17.75
24. Statutory Sick Pay 0 11 762147 1 £ 23.75
25. Lone Parents and Work 0 11 762147 X £ 12.95
26. The Effects of Benefit on Housing 0 11 762157 9 £ 18.50
Decisions
27. Making a Claim for Disability Benefits 0 11 762162 5 £ 12.95
28. Contributions Agency Customer 0 11 762220 6 £ 20.00
Satisfaction Survey 1993
29. Child Support Agency National Client 0 11 762224 9 £ 33.00
Satisfaction Survey 1993
30. Lone Mothers 0 11 762228 1 £ 16.75
31. Educating Employers 0 11 762249 4 £ 8.50
32. Employers and Family Credit 0 11 762272 9 £ 13.50
33. Direct Payments from Income Support 0 11 762290 7 £ 16.50
34. Incomes and Living Standards of 0 11 762299 0 £ 24.95
Older People
35. Choosing Advice on Benefits 0 11 762316 4 £ 13.95
36. First-time Customers 0 11 762317 2 £ 25.00
37. Contributions Agency National 0 11 762339 3 £ 21.00
Client Satisfaction Survey 1994
38. Managing Money in Later Life 0 11 762340 7 £ 22.00
39. Child Support Agency National 0 11 762341 5 £ 35.00
Client Satisfaction Survey 1994
40. Changes in Lone Parenthood 0 11 7632349 0 £ 20.00
41. Evaluation of Disability Living 0 11 762351 2 £ 40.00
Allowance and Attendance
Allowance
42. War Pensions Agency Customer 0 11 762358 X £ 18.00
Satisfaction Survey 1994
43. Paying for R ented Housing 0 11 762370 9 £ 19.00
133
44. R esettlement Agency Customer 0 11 762371 7 £ 16.00
Satisfaction Survey 1994
45. Changing Lives and the R ole of 0 11 762405 5 £ 20.00
Income Support
46. Social Assistance in OECD Countries: 0 11 762407 1 £ 22.00
Synthesis R eport
47. Social Assistance in OECD Countries: 0 11 762408 X £ 47.00
Country R eport
48. Leaving Family Credit 0 11 762411 X £ 18.00
49. Women and Pensions 0 11 762422 5 £ 35.00
50. Pensions and Divorce 0 11 762423 5 £ 25.00
51. Child Support Agency Client 0 11 762424 1 £ 22.00
Satisfaction Survey 1995
52. Take Up of Second Adult R ebate 0 11 762390 3 £ 17.00
53. Moving off Income Support 0 11 762394 6 £ 26.00
54. Disability, Benefits and Employment 0 11 762398 9 £ 30.00
55. Housing Benefit and Service Charges 0 11 762399 7 £ 25.00
56. Confidentiality: The public view 0 11 762434 9 £ 25.00
57. Helping Disabled Workers 0 11 762440 3 £ 25.00
58. Employers’ Pension Provision 1994 0 11 762443 8 £ 30.00
59. Delivering Social Security: A cross– 0 11 762447 0 £ 35.00
national study
60. A Comparative Study of Housing 0 11 762448 9 £ 26.00
Allowances
61. Lone Parents, Work and Benefits 0 11 762450 0 £ 25.00
62. Unemployment and Jobseeking 0 11 762452 7 £ 30.00
63. Exploring Customer Satisfaction 0 11 762468 3 £ 20.00
64. Social Security Fraud: The role of 0 11 762471 3 £ 30.00
penalties
65. Customer Contact with the Benefits 0 11 762533 7 £ 30.00
Agency
66. Pension Scheme Inquiries and Disputes 0 11 762534 5 £ 30.00
67. Maternity R ights and Benefits in 0 11 762536 1 £ 35.00
Britain
68. Claimants’ Perceptions of the Claim 0 11 762541 8 £ 23.00
Process
69. Delivering Benefits to Unemployed 0 11 762553 1 £ 27.00
People
134
70. Delivering Benefits to Unemployed 0 11 762557 4 £ 20.00
16–17 year olds
71. Stepping–Stones to Employment 0 11 762568 X £ 27.00
72. Dynamics of R etirement 0 11 762571 X £ 36.00
73. Unemployment and Jobseeking before 0 11 762576 0 £ 34.00
Jobseeker’s Allowance
74. Customer views on Service Delivery 0 11 762583 3 £ 27.00
in the Child Support Agency
75. Experiences of Occupational Pension 0 11 762584 1 £ 27.00
Scheme Wind–Up
76. R ecruiting Long–Term Unemployed 0 11 762585 X £ 27.00
People
77. What Happens to Lone Parents 0 11 762598 3 £ 31.00
78. Lone Parents Lives 0 11 762598 1 £ 34.00
79. Moving into Work: Bridging Housing 0 11 762599 X £ 33.00
Costs
80. Lone Parents on the Margins of Work 1 84123 000 6 £ 26.00
81. The R ole of Pension Scheme Trustees 1 84123 001 4 £ 28.00
82. Pension Scheme Investment Policies 1 84123 002 2 £ 28.00
83. Pensions and R etirement Planning 1 84123 003 0 £ 28.00
84. Self–Employed People and National 1 84123 004 9 £ 28.00
Insurance Contributions
85. Getting the Message Across 1 84123 052 9 £ 26.00
86. Leaving Incapacity Benefit 1 84123 087 1 £ 34.00
87. Unemployment and Jobseeking: 1 84123 088 X £ 38.00
Two Years On
88. Attitudes to the Welfare State and 1 84123 098 7 £ 36.00
the R esponse to R eform
89. New Deal for Lone Parents: 1 84123 101 0 £ 26.00
Evaluation of Innovative Schemes
90. Modernising service delivery: 1 84123 103 7 £ 26.00
The Lone Parent Prototype
91. Housing Benefit exceptional hardship 1 84123 104 5 £ 26.00
payments
92. New Deal for Lone Parents: 1 84123 107 X £ 29.00
Learning from the Prototype Areas
93. Housing Benefit and Supported 1 84123 118 5 £ 31.50
Accommodation
135
94. Disability in Great Britain 1 84123 119 3 £ 35.00
95. Low paid work in Britain 1 84123 120 7 £ 37.00
96. Keeping in touch with the Labour
Market 1 84123 126 6 £ 28.50
97. Housing Benefit and Council Tax
Benefit delivery: Claimant experiences 1 84123 127 4 £ 24.00
98. Employers’ Pension Provision 1996 1 84123 138 X £ 31.50
99. Unemployment and jobseeking after
the introduction of Jobseeker’s
Allowance 1 84123 146 0 £ 33.00
100. Overcoming barriers: Older people
and Income Support 1 84123 148 7 £ 29.00
101. Attitudes and aspirations of older
people: A review of the literature 1 84123 144 4 £ 34.00
102. Attitudes and aspirations of older
people: A qualitative study 1 84123 158 4 £ 29.00
103. R elying on the state,
relying on each other 1 84123 163 0 £ 27.00
104. Modernising Service Delivery:
The Integrated Services Prototype 1 84123 162 2 £ 27.00
105. Helping pensioners: Evaluation of
the Income Support Pilots 1 84123 164 9 £ 30.00
106. New Deal for disabled people:
Early implementation 1 84123 165 7 £ 39.50
107. Parents and employment: An analysis
of low income families in the British
Household Panel Survey 1 84123 167 3 £ 28.50
108. Evaluation of the New Deal for Lone
Parents: Early lessons from the Phase
One Prototype Synthesis R eport 1 84123 187 8 £ 27.50
109. Evaluation of the New Deal for Lone
Parents: Early lessons from the Phase
One Prototype Findings of Surveys 1 84123 3190 8 £ 42.50
110. Evaluation of the New Deal for Lone
Parents: Early lessons from the Phase
One Prototype Cost-benefit and
econometric analyses 1 84123 188 6 £ 29.50
111. Understanding the Impact of
Jobseeker’s Allowance 1 84123 192 4 £ 37.50
112. The First Effects of Earnings Top-up 1 84123 193 2 £ 39.50
136
113. Piloting change: Interim Qualitative
Findings from the Earnings
Top-up Evaluation 1 84123 194 0 £ 28.50
114. Building Up Pension R ights 1 84123 195 9 £ 33.50
115. Prospects of part-time work:
The impact of the Back to Work Bonus 1 84123 196 7 £ 29.00
116. Evaluating Jobseeker’s Allowance 1 84123 197 5 £ 16.00
117. Pensions and divorce:
The 1998 Survey 1 84123 198 3 £ 36.00
118. Pensions and divorce:
Exploring financial settlements 1 84123 199 1 £ 24.00
119. Local Authorities and Benefit
Overpayments 1 84123 200 9 £ 26.50
120. Lifetime Experiences of
Self-Employment 1 84123 218 1 £ 31.50
121. Evaluation of the Pension Power
Power for you Helpline 1 84123 221 1 £ 28.50
122. Lone Parents and Personal Advisers:
R oles and R elationships 1 84123 242 4 £ 29.00
123. Employers Pension Provision 1 84123 269 6 £ 35.00
124. The Changing R ole of the
Occupational Pension Scheme Trustee 1 84123 267 X £ 25.00
125. Saving and Borrowing 1 84123 277 7 £ 28.50
126. First Effects of ONE 1 84123 281 5 £ 38.50
127. Why not ONE? 1 84123 282 3 £ 25.00
128. The British Lone Parent Cohort
1991 to 1998 1 84123 283 1 £ 34.00
129. Housing Benefits  and
the Appeals Service 1 84123 294 7 £ 26.00
130. Pensions 2000 (Attitudes to
retirement planning) 1 84123 295 5 £ 33.00
131. Earnings Top-up Evaluation:
Effects on Unemployed People 1 84123 289 0 £ 38.00
132. Earnings Top-up Evaluation:
Employers’ R eactions 1 84123 290 4 £ 29.50
133. Earnings Top-up Evaluation:
Qualitative Evidence 1 84123 291 2 £ 30.00
134. Earnings Top-up Evaluation:
Effects on Low Paid Workers 1 84123 292 0 £ 37.00
135. Earnings Top-up Evaluation:
The Synthesis R eport 1 84123 293 9 £ 27.50
136. Modernising Service Delivery
The Better Government for
Older People Prototypes 1 84123 300 5 £ 28.00
137
137. The Verification Framework:
Early Experiences of  Implementation 1 84123 303 X £ 27.00
138. Low-income families in Britain
Work, welfare and social security
in 1999 1 84123 312 9 £ 53.00
139. R ecruiting benefit claimants
A survey of employers in
ONE pilot areas 1 84123 349 8 £ 26.50
140. Moving towards work:
The short term impact of ONE 1 84123 352 8 £ 27.50
141. Incapacity Benefits and
Work Incentives 1 84123 350 1 £ 28.00
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 761747 4 £ 8.00
1990–91
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 761833 0 £ 12.00
1991–92
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 762150 1 £ 13.75
1992–93
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 762302 4 £ 16.50
1993–94
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 762362 8 £ 20.00
1994–95
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 761446 2 £ 20.00
1995–96
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 0 11 762570 1 £ 27.00
1996–97
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 1 84123 086 3 £ 34.00
1997–98
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 1 84123 161 4 £ 30.00
1998–99
Social Security R esearch Yearbook 1 84123 286 6 £ 27.50
1999–2000
Further information regarding the content of the above may be obtained
from:
Department of Social Security
Attn. Paul Noakes
Social R esearch Branch
Analytical Services Division 5
4-26 Adelphi
1–11 John Adam Street
London WC2N 6HT

